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"... It can be argued that present day Japan's foreign policy must always be seen against the immense fiery backdrop of defeat, that few modern countries have managed to go through so ghastly, so mutilating an experience and to emerge as organized societies."

The Survival of Historical Japan

BY PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

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THERE are still two living emperors in East Asia—the Emperor of China and the Emperor of Japan. They are well worth contrasting with one another, since their individual histories tell much about their countries.

The younger of the two, now 52 years old, is the Emperor of China or, more properly, the former Manchu Emperor of China. He reigned with the honorific style, the Hsüan T'ung Emperor of the Great Ch'ing Dynasty. His personal name is P'u-i. He has been vulgarly known in the Western press as "Mr. Henry Pu-yi." Even in dethronement he deserves a less ridiculous name than that. Perhaps he might be called by his proper Manchu clan name, Prince P'u-i of the Aisin Gioro. He reigned as Emperor of China from January 3, 1909, until February 17, 1912. He had been placed on the throne by a usurping tyrant, the Empress Dowager Yehonola. This remarkable, ignorant, vicious and incredibly brave old woman held the collapsing empire of China together until her own death: it did not fall until four years after she died. The Chinese boy emperor ruled from his third year of life until his sixth. His world is gone but he still lives—a forgotten, middle-aged prisoner.

By contrast, the other emperor, grandson to the unforgettable Meiji Emperor of Japan, has ruled as emperor all his adult life. Born in 1901, he became Prince Regent in the early 1920's and became emperor him-

self in 1925. Japanese coins and official documents bear their dates, not by numbers such as 1941 or 1958, but by the year of his reign. This year, for example, is the year 33—it now being 33 years since the Prince Hirohito ascended the throne and became the Showa Emperor of Japan.

The present Chinese Emperor was not an emperor very long nor was China an empire in his time. China became a Republic and fell into the evil days of war lord division. Under the Nationalists, the Chinese created the real beginning of unity, only to be crippled and devastated by the Japanese invasion. Victory was bought at the price of collapse; the country fell to the Communist party of China. Through all this time the unfortunate Chinese Emperor has been the puppet of one faction or the other.

His boyhood years were spent in the Peking palaces, the golden-roofed Forbidden City. He was almost as much a curiosity as any other museum piece left behind from an earlier age. A sympathetic English tutor, Sir Reginald Johnston, taught him the elements of respect and self-respect. For a few short years of adult life he lived in the city of Tientsin, long enough to marry, to read, to write, to travel about a little, and to make friends. With the coming of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, he was half swindled and half kidnapped into Japanese territory and became the puppet Emperor of Manchoukuo.

As Puppet Emperor he served his Japanese "advisers" for a long and humiliating period of 14 years, 1931-1945. When the forces of the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria, he became a Russian state prisoner. Only recently has the press reported that the Soviet authorities have turned this unfortunate man over to the Chinese Communist government and that he is once again home and still a prisoner—not important enough for the Communists to kill him, not unimportant enough for them to let him go. Guilty of no crime, he is likely to spend the rest of his life the victim of nothing more than his own name.

His destiny is not unlike that of his people. China too has lost its historical identity, has broken with its past, and moved forward, driven by forces larger than any one Chinese can understand or explain. It is easy enough for Chinese to write books about the dynamics of Chinese history but it is very hard to justify those same books—save for Communist dogma, enforced through Orwellian "rectification"—a few years later. All rationalizations have been true in China but true for the time only. It is entirely appropriate that a man now less than 60 years old should symbolize China's irretrievable past.

The Japanese Contrast

By contrast the Showa Emperor, known to the American press as Hirohito, is not only very much alive; he is still a figure in world affairs. He gives to Japanese public life a continuity as vigorous, as meaningful and as dramatic as the continuity offered Britain by the capable and beautiful Queen Elizabeth II. He is no prisoner; and even the Allied powers, who among them commanded more military force, including the atomic bomb, than any other military organization in all of history, hesitated to dethrone him. They knew that they could wreck Japan and that they could destroy the institution of the Japanese empire but they feared that their own losses in that political demolition would not be worth the price. In Japan, history still stands on the institutional surface; in China, much of the heritage has drained away.

It is therefore true to say that in China history lives only under the soil. Like sub-soil water, history is always there and history is always important. It is not very evident upon the everyday scene. Mao Tse-tung and his marshals may stand before the unchangeable architecture of the Forbidden City wearing preposterous imitations of the uniform of Soviet marshals. Their faces may be Chinese but their uniforms are Russian. Their red flags are French in origin. Their ideas are German. Their hopes for technology are American. The past is very far behind such men.

The Japanese Emperor may stand in parade or may be seen outside his palace but he is far more Japanese than his Chinese Communist rivals are Chinese. In him the past still lives. It lives in more than him.

Under Hirohito, Japan has recovered from mortal wounds. Japan is a country of superlatives—the country furthest away from the ancient world of our own Western past, the country last defeated in the game of nations, the first nation to be attacked by atomic bombs, and the country with the oldest continuous government in the world. To this could be added other characterizations: Japan is the only country which has had few rebellions and no revolutions whatever or—equally probably—it could be called the only country which has succeeded in contriving its own rebirth in the face of major cultural emergencies.

Japan became Chinese in the seventh century and skimmed the cream of Chinese civilization; Japan fought off the Mongol invaders of Kublai Khan in the thirteenth century and survived; Japan withstood the infiltrations and encroachments of the Western powers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and was the only nation outside Siam and to a lesser degree, China, to preserve its independence in the nineteenth century Far East. Now Japan has survived the incursions of an attacker worse than the Mongols—the Americans.

The Three Strata of the Past

Three periods of Japanese history can be seen as influencing the present. They make a weird three-dimensional montage

rather like some of the mobiles with which the Japanese decorate their homes. These three periods are prehistoric Japan, Japan of the Confucian Family of Nations, and modern Japan down to the year of defeat, 1945.

Prehistoric Japan survives in the Shinto religion, in the great shrines such as Ise, and in the worship accorded in secular form to the Tenno, who has been known vulgarly in the West as the Mikado. This basic level of Japanese civilization has little to do with China. It is much more reminiscent of the glories, the picturesqueness and the splendour of the autochthonous cultures of old New Zealand and of old Hawaii. The earliest civilization survives in many beautiful and interesting details of everyday Japanese life. In many of the subtler bonds that bind the fabric of Japanese society together, and in a large number of characteristics which make the Japanese so distinctly themselves as compared with other Far Eastern peoples who have been more closely Chinafied, these Japanese archaisms are unique.

The Japanese have their share of the Chinese past living with them. This influence dates from the period of the Confucian Family of Nations—the seventh to nineteenth centuries, A.D.—in which Japan resisted encroachment to the world empire of China while one Chinese dynasty after another went through the great pretense of writing Japan down as a vassal. The struggle between China and Japan lasted well over a thousand years. The Japanese at the very edge of recorded history fought the Chinese in Korea and were driven out only by a series of spectacular naval battles in the years 622 and 663 of our era. Chinese and Japanese fought again when the Chinese supported Mongol invasions in 1274 and thereafter.

It would be absurd to connect the Japanese-Mongol war with the immediate present if one were to place a compulsive emphasis on historical parallels but it is not improper to remember the coloration which history so often gives to new events. For example, the Japanese were really saved from the Mongolian invasion, which the Chinese supported, by the coming of a *hamikaze*—a miraculous typhoon which not once but twice tore up the Mongol fleet

and saved Japan from the greatest over-water armada to sail the seas until the embarkation of Eisenhower's water-borne forces for Normandy.

In this period of the Confucian Family of Nations Japan was always the outside power watching and learning. The Japanese absorbed Buddhism, an Indian religion, through China and learned it with Chinese commentaries. They had taken the Chinese language early in their history. They added Chinese ethics, Chinese art, Chinese architecture, Chinese manners, parts of Chinese cooking. They watched the Chinese world; the Chinese world reached far beyond China to include almost the entire Pacific coasts and islands of Asia. Vietnam, Malacca, Burma and Tibet were accessible through China. A great deal of what happened in the time of Japanese aggression, 1931-1945, can be explained, at least in part, as an attempted modern Japanese recreation of the Confucian Family of Nations with the single change that China was to be a subject and not a master and that the Japanese were to emerge the new rulers of an old Far Eastern world.

They displayed historical memory in the course of World War II. The special attention which the Japanese put to establishing their own territory in Malaya, which they called Marai, the reluctance which they showed in planning for the independence of Indonesia, the swiftness with which they moved to create a new government under the Adipadi in Burma, and even the imperial dream in which they supported an Asian India represented by the *Azad Hind Fauj* under Subhas Chandra Bose showed that the territorial limit of their militarist empire was closely fitted to the traditions of the Chinese past.

The third stratum of Japanese historical memory is, of course, the experience in the modern state system, from 1853 onward. Japanese had their country opened by an American naval force under Matthew Perry. They accepted the restrictive treaties which the British, Americans, French, Russians and Dutch imposed on Asian nations wherever they could—limitations of their own jurisdiction over foreigners, guarantees as to tariffs, and the assignment of special zones

for foreign residence and administration within Japan. They did, however, shake off these restrictions by meeting the Westerners at their own game of industrialization and machine-based militarism. The Japanese won successive wars against China in 1895, against Russia in 1905, against Germany in 1918 and against Manchuria in 1931 without finding reason to doubt that imperialist aggression was as "modern" as the telephone and as useful as iodine. The defeat of 1945 changed all that. Defeat brought into question not only their own past, but also that other, wider past which they had borrowed from the West.

Their native cults and usages, their Chinese culture, their Western adaptations and modernization—none of these availed much against the American conquest of the Western Pacific. The Japanese had tried all remedies, and they had all proved to be wrong.

A less hard-working people might have lapsed into corruption, decadence or romantic reaction. Disappointment did not bring a repudiation of all things Japanese, though the defeat certainly hastened cultural changes which might otherwise have taken centuries.

Past and Present in Japanese Policies

It would be foolish to exaggerate the purely sentimental and historical pressures upon militarist Japan in setting up the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. There were very real strategic, logistic and raw-materials motivations for the particular pattern which that empire assumed. Nevertheless, it can be argued that present-day Japan's foreign policy must always be seen against the immense fiery backdrop of defeat, that few modern countries have managed to go through so ghastly, so mutilating an experience and to emerge as organized societies.

Compared to the tragedy of Japan's atomic defeat by the United States and occupation by the Allied powers, the Russian revolution was physically and militarily a relatively minor ordeal. After all, no foreigner sat in Moscow dictating Russia's destiny to the Russian people. For better or for worse,

the Russians changed leaders and went on their own course with the conviction that they were trying something on their own.

Even so apparently modern a factor as Japan's present response to communism must be gauged in terms of the Japanese experience. It is traditional for Japanese in public life to show a very deep and anxious fear of political heresy. The Japanese are firmly persuaded that infiltration and subordination *do* work. They are almost as conscious of the dangers of subversion as are the Russians themselves, who well know how small a touch of conspiracy it takes, applied at the right time, to overthrow a great empire. Considering this factor in the Japanese past, it is natural for some Japanese to place a high over-confidence in the capacity of communism to wipe the entire cultural slate clean and to believe the wildest fables of the Chinese Communists concerning the complete transformation of Chinese civilization under the leadership of Mr. Mao Tse-tung.

By contrast, the mainland Chinese look back at their history and they fear anarchy far more than they fear subversion. They dread freedom within themselves. They take fright at the possible impulses of their closest friends. All Chinese living today have experienced the dreadful ataxia of too much freedom. The Chinese Communist response toward freedom is not merely the horror shown by the Soviet authorities against new conspirators who might repeat the performance of Lenin and Trotsky: it is a fear of freedom itself which sometimes resembles a dread of man's most elementary impulses. The need for order in China is so extreme that even tyranny cannot seem to supply enough of it—at least, not in the eyes of Mao Tse-tung and of his cadres who have inherited the nightmares but not the reassurances of their own cultural past. After all, they do keep the unfortunate Prince of the Aisin Gioro a hopeless, useless prisoner somewhere in Red China even when he has done nothing to them and they do not know what to do with him.

Japanese history lives on in the somewhat apologetic way in which Japanese politicians and businessmen treat the peoples who were so recently their victims, in the cagey inqui-

sitiveness shown by the Japanese toward Chinese and Russian communism, and in the stout good sense of the Japanese, when overwhelmed by disaster, to seek recovery from within the aegis of their most powerful enemy—the United States. Americans who expect the Japanese to respond with loathing to a mere glimpse of the Communist heresy often forget that most American beliefs are probably as abominable in the eyes of many Japanese as are Russian beliefs. We are no less odd than the Soviets. The Japanese have adjusted to us and they have found a good world on our side. Few of them are so foolish as to think that they have not had to work hard to earn this good world and that they will not have to continue to work to earn a further place in it. Yet the Asia which surrounds them has its temptations too.

Against such countries whose history today is seen only through a veil of tears, tears wet at the recent ignominy of European colonialism, the Japanese view of history must indeed appear to be very sharp and assured. China marches forward from chaos: Japan marches forward with order.

The further adaptation of Japanese culture to the main stream of world history will depend in part on the chances of strategy, the turns of economics, the blunders or successes of each side in the cold war. It must be remembered that the Japanese repeatedly have accomplished that "rally of the whole people" often dreamed by patriots in many lands. They already possess political

solidarity and that national consciousness which China, Indonesia, Pakistan or Malaya will reach only after decades of thinking, teaching, debating and writing. In this, and in the effective limitations which they have imposed on their own population growth, the Japanese have a substantial lead over their Asian neighbors.

The changes of Japanese life at the level of the home, the school and the farm will unquestionably have more to do with the survival of traditional Japanese values than will world affairs. Even at the most obvious levels of national self-awareness, the Japanese have a living sense of their own identity. In a world wherein all nations are threatened as much from within as from without, this is a major psychological asset.

Paul M. A. Linebarger has taught in many colleges and universities and has served as consultant to many government agencies. He has lived intermittently in the Far East since 1919 and was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University of Canberra, A.C.T., in 1957. He is author of seven published books on the Far East including *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen* and co-author of *Far Eastern Governments and Politics*.

"Those who won our independence believed that . . . the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as means. . . . They believe that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government."

—Justice Brandeis, *Whitney v. California*, 1927.

"As Japan approaches the thirteenth anniversary of surrender, over-all political trends would seem to warrant a cautious optimism," according to this specialist, who asserts that "the current institutional structure, even if it were modified somewhat, provides a viable framework for parliamentary government, and both major parties are dedicated to that pathway."

Japanese Politics Since Independence

BY ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

Professor of Political Science, University of California

THE fascination of recent Japanese politics lies partly in the chance to study the first independent reactions of Japanese society to a tumultuous period of foreign tutelage. Inevitably, a series of questions intrigues the student of social science.

Which elements within the American democratization experiment will prove to have some lasting impact and which will be ephemeral? Toward what type of basic synthesis in political values and institutions is modern Japan moving? Does parliamentary democracy have a chance in the most highly industrialized and literate society of Asia?

It is axiomatic that no final answers can be given to these questions, especially since fluidity is still the hallmark of Japanese politics at many crucial levels. The answers in any case are certain to hinge in part upon external developments. Nevertheless, contemporary Japanese politics provide very basic data for some preliminary judgments.


First, it should be noted that after six years of independence, government and politics in Japan continue to operate under

the broad institutional framework established during the Occupation. Only a few significant changes have been made thus far. Perhaps the most important legal alterations have been in the direction of augmenting centralized, national control in some fields previously earmarked for greater local autonomy. Police administration is one prominent example. In general, however, the massive legal reforms of the early Occupation period have remained on the statute books.

How long this will continue is uncertain. The Kishi administration is currently spearheading a drive for constitutional revision and supplementary legal changes on a fairly substantial scale. Conservative arguments include the themes that the present Constitution, an American-made document, does not reflect the needs or nature of Japanese society, that important parts of the present institutional structure have proven anachronistic or unworkable, and that only through an independent constitutional effort can some Japanese political ethos or spirit be recaptured. Attention has centered particularly upon the sections defining the Emperor's position, those relating to the structure of the Diet, the Supreme Court, and the famous anti-war article. A Committee on Constitutional Revision, boycotted by the Socialists, is considering changes.

In practical terms, however, the issue hinges on the next few elections; the conservative Liberal-Democratic party must capture more than two-thirds of the seats in the next election for the House of Representatives and the 1959 elections for the House of Councillors to achieve its aim.

Robert A. Scalapino is author of *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan* and *Reflections on American Relations with Japan*. Both a Ford and Rockefeller Foundations grantee, he was a guest lecturer at Waseda and Keio Universities, Japan, in 1952-1953.



Department of State

Ironically perhaps, the Japanese Socialists have become the great champions of the "MacArthur Constitution."

In the long run, changes in the Japanese Constitution of 1946 are likely. No political group argues that it is sacred. Everyone desires certain changes providing these accord with his own political views. It is highly improbable, however, that the old Meiji Constitution or anything closely re-

sembling it will be reenacted. Japan will not go back to 1889. The constitutional issues of 1958 are vastly different in substance from the sterile arguments of the pre-war period. At present, no one is seriously debating the burning issue of earlier years, the question of whether the Emperor should be a part of the State or above it. In this fact lies some indication of the great progress that has been achieved in making Japanese

constitutionalism a force for political modernism.

Whatever the results of the current constitutional debate, therefore, a significant change has been wrought by a combination of forces—the Occupation, the evolution of Japanese society, and that of the modern world. Since the present Constitution relegates the Emperor to a ceremonial role and makes the Prime Minister and Cabinet responsible to the Diet, the strategic heights of power are now held by the political parties, those indispensable media for effectuating modern parliamentary government.

Conservative Dominance

Before surveying the current parties, however, a few general factors about recent Japanese politics should be noted briefly. Perhaps the most indisputable fact about the postwar political scene is the continued dominance of the Conservatives. Despite Socialist gains, the Conservatives have not yet been seriously challenged. Whether divided or united, they have consistently polled approximately two-thirds of the votes and held a similar number of Diet seats. Conservative power in Japan has been abetted by many factors: ample funds, a stock of experienced leaders and "famous names," well established prewar roots on a national scale, recent economic gains and the weaknesses and divisions within the Socialist camp.

But the most basic causative factor has probably lain in the essential conservatism of the Japanese socio-economic system. Japan has represented one of the world's foremost hierarchical societies. Paternalism and a sense of social responsibility among the élite have interacted with submissiveness and an acceptance of higher authority among the Japanese commoners. Another interaction bolstering conservatism has been that between family and society, with the former supplying the values of filial piety, discipline and an acceptance of status.

A serious issue can be raised, however, as to whether this most basic of Conservative assets has not suffered serious erosion in the past decade or so. The pattern of extensive social upheaval that accompanied defeat and the era of the American "New Deal," to-

gether with the continuous inroads of further industrialization and urbanization, have clearly put traditional values and institutions in jeopardy. Today, a considerable portion of the older, more conservative Japanese are inclined to argue that the younger generation is headed straight for juvenile delinquency, showing proper respect for neither Emperor nor parents. To the foreign observer, these fears seem sharply exaggerated, but there can be little doubt that the attitudes and values of yesteryear have been undergoing accelerated change. The Conservatives themselves are paying increasing homage to this fact in practical politics as we shall note.

Another political factor of basic importance in recent years has been the shifting nature of Japanese pressure groups. In the prewar period, great power rested with the commercial-industrial, landowner, and military groups. The alliances and rivalries among these groups determined the nature of Japanese conservatism and the current balance of power. The puny strength of organized labor and its auxiliary forces helped to account for the impotence of the prewar Left wing.

Time and events have produced various alterations in this picture. For more than a decade, the military have been almost totally absent from the Japanese political scene. There is no sign of their revival as yet. As the result of a radical land reform program, moreover, the structure of the Japanese agrarian classes has undergone considerable change. On the one hand, absentee landlords and most of the small agrarian élite have suffered serious reverses of economic power; on the other hand, the once numerous tenant class has been sharply reduced through land redistribution. This movement toward egalitarianism may have only temporary effect, and up to the present, it has probably served as a positive asset to the Conservatives. The old rumblings of agrarian unrest have been much subdued in the postwar era.

At the same time, however, changes of this type inevitably produce greater social and political fluidity in the long run. As one indication, it is less easy today to identify and categorize the spokesmen for "agra-

rian interests." The basis of political authority in the rural areas has been somewhat broadened and its voice made somewhat less uniform.

One should be careful not to draw unwarranted conclusions. The Japanese farmers still vote Conservative by a heavy majority; this group, in many respects, is the backbone of Conservative power. Some 45 per cent of the Japanese people live and work in rural areas. In the future, however, the Conservatives will have to rely more upon policy and personality than upon a tradition of unquestioning support to hold their rural vote. Thus far, the Socialists have shown no great imagination in making a political appeal to the agrarian segment of the electorate, but the opportunities are present, especially among younger age groups.

Liberal Democrats

The greatest influence upon the Liberal Democratic party today comes from the commercial-industrial elements who have a major voice in determining policy, appointments and general orientation. Modern Japanese conservatism reflects in very substantial degree the values and interests of the urban business class, although of course this class does not always speak with a single voice. At the same time, however, this modern conservatism contains both an element of historic "bureaucratism" on the one hand and a new consciousness of public opinion on the other hand. It is this latter factor, as expressed in campaigning and policy responses, that may make Japanese conservatism a more vital force than in the past. And certainly this new anxiety about the public is a product in considerable measure of the shifts and the broadening nature of the pressure groups operating in the political scene.

On the other side of the political spectrum, organized labor has risen to become a political force of considerable significance, despite its continuing divisions and weaknesses. Organized labor together with the unorganized intellectuals form the dominant force within the Socialist party. Major financial and organizational support for the

Socialists comes from this group, especially Sohyo, the largest national federation of labor unions. This is not an unmixed blessing for the party. In Japan, unlike England, the Socialist Party must obtain support from the agrarian and small-medium enterprise groups if it hopes to secure a majority. Current Left wing and labor leaders of the party sometimes pay homage to this fact in words but rarely in action. Yet actually, a considerable proportion of Socialist voters come from middle class, white collar, and rural elements, and many more voters of these types will be needed if the Socialists are to score impressive gains.

Whatever the political future, however, the fact remains that Japan has now achieved a better representation and a more adequate balancing of her diverse socio-economic groups in the political scene than at any time in the past. The relative strength of various pressure groups in Japan has not only changed in certain cases in comparison with the prewar era; in nearly every case, the base from which they operated has been broadened. As one result, public opinion—as it is felt or imagined—now acquires increasing respect from most political leaders.

Another impressive political factor of the recent past has been the upsurge of nationalism among all political elements. The nationalist movement of the last six years has been in part a natural reaction to the Occupation and a period of extensive self-criticism. It is more than an assertion of independence, however. In its implications externally, it symbolizes the renewed search for world recognition in some form. Internally, it is a method of expressing the desire for a more unified set of values and institutions.

In several respects, its political effect differs from that of earlier periods. Previously, it was largely a monopoly of the Right wing; they shaped its ideological and practical connotations. Today it is a weapon of all groups; hence it knows no single policy or ideological line, and in certain respects, this makes it more compatible with a democratic system and more modern in its over-all influence. And for the moment at least, Japanese nationalism is more defensive in character, reminiscent of the early Meiji period.

The themes of a messianic mission and those of racial or cultural superiority are absent or strongly muted. In its positive aspects, the nationalist movement now lays stress upon expansion through economic and cultural interaction. In general, it pays homage to the realities of the modern world in which Japan cannot be a foremost military or political power.

The previous political factors mentioned relate essentially to national politics at their broadest levels. One final element worthy of attention relates specifically to the status and morale of the Japanese bureaucracy. Here it is extremely hazardous to generalize upon a vast and complicated subject, and one that has been little studied as yet. There is considerable evidence, however, to suggest that in this segment of Japanese government, the throes of transition continue to be more severe. A large number of the older civil servants, trained in the traditional manner and now holding important posts, are unreconciled to many aspects of the new order, feel a widening gulf between themselves and their subordinates, and are generally unhappy. The younger group of civil servants themselves, however, are insecure in many respects—uncertain of their position in society and the values that should govern them. In general, the status of the official has further declined and the financial rewards are meager.

At present, the problems of official morale and official corruption, that universal scourge of Asian politics, appear more serious in Japan than in the past. These problems warrant attention all the more because the Japanese bureaucracy continues to wield great power. In many ways, Japan is still a statist society, and one is constantly aware of the importance of officialdom in matters great and small.

Two-Party Politics

With these general factors in mind, we can turn to the vital center of Japanese politics, the political parties. Within the last six years, Japan has achieved a two-party system, albeit one that is still precarious. Shortly after the Left and Right wing Socialists succeeded in reuniting the Socialist

Party, the two conservative parties finally merged as the Liberal Democratic Party. Other political groups are negligible in strength.

The Liberal Democrats dominate the political scene today, as has been noted, and probably will continue to do so for the near future at least. Their domestic policy includes support for constitutional revision, modifications in labor laws to secure firmer control over government employees, encouragement of economic expansion with major reliance upon private enterprise, modest rearmament, and an enlarged social welfare program. Prime Minister Kishi has set as one goal of his administration "the elimination of poverty."

In the area of foreign policy, the Liberal Democrats adhere to the theme of an independent policy within the framework of alliance with the West. They support close political and economic ties with the United States, and the continuance of American military bases in Japan for the time being. However, they favor the return of Okinawa to Japanese administrative control and they have supported a continuous search for enlarged economic relations with Communist China. The most cherished project of Kishi, however, is a Japanese program of technical assistance and expanded trade with South and Southeast Asia, supported in part by American assistance. This type of economic regionalism has been actively explored by Kishi in a series of visits into the area. Initial doubts and reservations remain strong in some countries, but in actual fact, the foundations for such a program have already been established among many of the states of this region. In the meantime, the admission of Japan to the United Nations and her subsequent election to the Security Council were hailed by the government as signs of rising Japanese prestige in world circles.

Some people are referring to current Liberal-Democratic policies as the model of the new Japanese conservatism: in domestic affairs, dedicated to democracy and shaped with the public interest in mind; in foreign affairs, internationally minded without militarism or aggression. Others, including the Japanese Socialists, are dubious that the "new Conservatism" is more than a myth:

they fear recurrent waves of reactionary legislation, including a major assault upon the liberal provisions of the Constitution; they see the Liberal-Democrats as the party upholding the privileged classes, spending their way into power via massive vote-buying, and paying lip service only to the public welfare.

Whatever the balance of truth in this argument, it is true that at the public level at least, Conservative policy and leadership have undergone some change. It can be seen most clearly perhaps in the difference between Mr. Yoshida, Prime Minister at the time of the San Francisco Treaty, and Mr. Kishi, the present incumbent. Yoshida was the prototype in many respects of the old fashioned Conservative political leader, with scant regard for press, public opinion, or, indeed, his own party leaders. He made it reasonably clear that public appearances were annoying and parties were little more than a necessary evil. Kishi, on the other hand, has gone to great lengths to sell himself and his program to the Japanese people. He has stumped the nation repeatedly, carefully watched public reactions, and sought to personalize his administration. In this respect at least, the Japanese Conservatives have a new look.

The program of the Socialist Party reflects the current balance of power within the party which at the leadership levels is about 60 per cent Left and 40 per cent Right. Actually, the divisions are much more complex than this would indicate, but the Left wing has controlled policy since the reunion. In their domestic program, the Socialists give a prominent place to the nationalization of basic industry, the strengthening of land reform, support for small and medium industry, and the defense of the Constitution. In foreign policy, the Socialist position is strongly neutralist, opposing the Military Security Treaty with the United States, American bases in Japan, and other evidences of "dependency" upon American policy; supporting the recognition of Communist China, and favoring in general a policy similar to that followed by India in the international scene.

No one can predict the future of the two-party system in Japan with any great assurance. The obstacles are formidable. The

Socialists are deeply divided on policy matters, and this reflects deeper ideological cleavages. The bulk of the Left wing remain "old Marxists" curiously similar to the Left wing German Social Democrats of the First World War era; the moderates hew more closely to the Fabian line. It is not easy to bridge this gap. The issues separating the Conservatives are more personal than policy, but this makes them none the less serious. The nucleus of Japanese politics continues to be the leader-follower group. A series of these clusters make up each of the major parties, and personal rivalries for power among leaders produce unending factional disputes. In the past, these disputes have repeatedly ripped the parties apart.

Despite these hazards, however, the odds seem to favor slightly the continuance of the two party system, or perhaps one should say the two large alliances. The Socialists are aware that without a unified party, they have no hope, and since they have some hope now, they are more willing to live with their differences. The Liberal Democrats recognize the Socialists as an increasing threat, and are not likely to split if the Socialists remain united. In all probability, both parties will hold their lines for the next few elections, and it is generally expected that the Socialists will make some gains, although insufficient to come to power. Meanwhile, there may be some gradual softening of ideological divisions.

Communism

There remains another force in the political scene, the Japanese Communist Party. Currently, the J.C.P. is at a very low ebb due to a variety of factors. Internal scandals have rocked the party and factionalism is rife. Actually, however, the weaknesses of the Japanese Communists have always been pronounced due both to the nature of their society and their own shortcomings. With the exception of the January, 1949, elections when the Socialists were beset with multiple failures and divisions, the Communists have never polled more than 3 per cent of the vote. They have not been able to capture nationalism, the major Communist weapon in Asia. On the contrary,

their subservience to the U.S.S.R. has been obvious, and Russia is not particularly popular with the Japanese for many reasons. The Communists have suffered from numerous and abrupt tactical changes. After 1950, they were also damaged by the fact that their leaders were forced to go underground and their main organizations were smashed.

There is another side to the picture. Infiltration has given the party somewhat greater power than its popular following would indicate. Communist themes are often implanted successfully in certain non-Communist organizations. Naturally, this is easier because of the large, fairly orthodox Marxist following in Japan. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Communists will capture any major Japanese organization, and the appeal for a popular front will continue to be denied by the Socialists. In the final analysis, Japanese Communist chances will come—if ever—only after the Socialists have tried and failed, assuming that they do not receive massive external assistance.

As Japan approaches the thirteenth anniversary of her surrender, over-all political trends would seem to warrant a cautious optimism. Any such optimism must be predicated upon the assumption that the generally favorable economic conditions will continue,

and that international war can be avoided. It must also take account of many problems implicit in this era of flux and transition.

A large proportion of the Japanese people remain apolitical or uncommitted. The thesis that politics is synonymous with graft has many adherents in Japan, and events sometimes seem to prove it. The political parties are still woefully inadequate as mass organizations, attracting and holding popular loyalties. The need for younger, dynamic leadership is apparent in nearly every political camp.

On the other hand, the current institutional structure, even if it were modified somewhat, provides a viable framework for parliamentary government, and both major parties are dedicated to that pathway. The rising importance of public opinion and the more adequate reflection of existing socioeconomic interests are heartening signs. But perhaps most important is the fact that the Japanese industrial revolution is well along the road of mature development, with the bulk of the sacrifices implicit in a forced march toward modernism behind, and an accumulation of skills, techniques and attitudes that can now be utilized for the common good. In this lies the greatest long-run hope for democracy, Japanese-style.

"A real national tradition is something that we live by rather than something that we talk about. We seldom try to define it; we feel that we don't have to, because if it is a real, living, moving force—and it is, if it is a genuine national tradition—we simply respond to it. We respond to it instinctively, because it is so deeply a part of our lives that it has us in its possession.

"The greatest of all American traditions is the simple tradition of freedom. From our earliest days as a people, this tradition has provided us with a faith to live by. It has shaped what Americans have done and what they have dreamed. If any one word tells what America really is, it is that one word—freedom. . . .

"... The American tradition will flourish in the future as it has in the past. That tradition, to repeat, is something that lives inside of us. It is not a set of laws; and freedom itself is not simply the absence of restraint. Rather, it is an abiding inner faith that cannot be limited by doubt or by confusion or by fear. It is something built into the American soul, and in the long run it is unconquerable.

"The secret of the American tradition is freedom—freedom unabridged and unadulterated, freedom that applies to everybody in the land at all times and places, freedom for those with whom we disagree as well as for those with whom we do agree."

—Bruce Catton, *The American Tradition*, an address before The Fund for the Republic, Feb. 21, 1957.

One of Japan's gravest problems is continuing population pressure. "In order to absorb both the newly created and the unemployed labor forces, the country's gross national production has to be increased at an annual rate of 6.5 per cent," writes this specialist. For this reason, "it is a required condition for Japan to depend on imports of raw materials. . . ."

Population Pressures in Japan

BY AKIRA DOI

Member of the Showa Dojin Kai study group

IT is my purpose here to outline how Japan as a "have-not" country solves her problem of growing population and what measures are being taken for its solution at present. The subject also involves the problem of Japan's foreign trade. In the first place, however, it would be useful for the reader to be acquainted with some information about the area, population and resources of Japan.

The total area of Japan comprised of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu together with the numerous smaller islands is 370,000 square kilometers, which is slightly larger than the area of 244,000 square kilometers of the British Isles, but less than one twentieth that of the United States, amounting to 7,828,000 square kilometers.

Mountainous Japan lies in the belt of volcanoes with the consequence that her arable land area is scanty. Although land reclamation has been carried out to a maxi-

mum extent for cultivation, the area of cultivated land is 51,000 square kilometers or only 13.8 per cent of the total area. The figures are far less than similar figures in the British Isles where 29.5 per cent of the area is cultivated or in the United States, where 24.7 per cent is cultivated—1,934,000 square kilometers. Thus the British Isles have a larger cultivated area—72,000 square kilometers—than Japan although the total area is less than Japan. The cultivated area of the United States is more than 38 times that of Japan.

Japan's population in 1956 was 90,250,000, while in the British Isles and the United States it was respectively 51,220,000 and 165,270,000 in 1955. Thus the population density in these countries is respectively in order of 244, 210 and 21 persons per square kilometer. Even more significant is the population density per square kilometer of cultivated land. It is 1,773 persons in Japan as compared to 711 persons in the British Isles and 86 persons in the United States. This means that the British Isles hold less than half the number of persons in the cultivated area and the United States less than one twentieth as compared to Japan. All this indicates the high density of population in Japan.

Because Japan's agriculture is intensive, the productivity of cultivated land is high. For instance, the production of rice (unhulled), the staple food for Japanese, amounts to 4.8 tons per hectare as compared to 3.3 tons in the United States while in India it is only 1.3 tons. As far as rice production is concerned Japan ranks the highest.

The high yields per acre have been brought

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The Declining Rate of Population Growth in Japan
(in thousands)

Year	Population	Births	Birth rate	Deaths	Death rate	Increase in population	Rate of growth
1946-50 (average)	80,000	2,599	3.25	985	1.23	1,614	2.02
1951	84,573	2,138	2.53	839	0.99	1,299	1.54
1952	85,852	2,005	2.34	765	0.89	1,240	1.44
1953	87,033	1,868	2.15	773	0.89	1,095	1.26
1954	88,293	1,770	2.00	721	0.82	1,048	1.19
1955	89,276	1,731	1.94	694	0.78	1,038	1.16
1956	90,253	1,662	1.84	724	0.80	938	1.04

about through efforts to improve cultivation, as will be proved by the following fact. Rice production per acre has been doubled during the past 60 years and the rate of higher yields became more increased in recent years. Moreover, as rice production became less dependent on weather conditions, the differences between the yields of rich and poor harvests have gradually been minimized.

At one time after World War II the import of rice to Japan reached 1,430,000 tons. It has been, however, gradually decreased; the recent import is on the level of 760,000 tons and further decrease is estimated. The trend is mainly caused by increased rice production as a result of improved cultivation.

Nevertheless, the shortage of food in Japan is still seen as very acute. Although all possible measures are taken to develop dairy farming and cold highland agriculture, still the solution of present difficulties remains to be met. The annual import of foodgrains such as rice, wheat, barley, corn, and so forth has risen to about 4.5 million tons which constitute about 20 per cent of the total food consumption of the country.

Population Growth

We have to face here the problem of population. The average population of Japan during 1926-1930 was 62,050,000; the rate of growth averaged 1.42 per cent. During 1946-1950 the annual average of population was 80,000,000 whereby the rate of growth soared to 2.02 per cent. This rapid growth of population exerted a heavy pressure on the economy of Japan.

Birth control was adopted to remove the pressure; its effect has become apparent in recent years. The average birth rate of 3.25 per cent during the years 1946-1950 dropped to 1.84 per cent in 1956. Although the death rate also dropped in the same period, the declining birth rate has contributed to the decline of population growth, lowered from 2.02 per cent to the rate of 1.04 per cent.

As the above table shows, it appears that the decline of the rate of population growth will continue at least for the next several years at an estimated rate which may remain around 0.8 per cent. The rate taken for international comparison will be very low. Yet the present population numbers 90,250,000 with the trend towards growth estimated to be 96,960,000 in 1960, 100,030,000 in 1970 and 110,620,000 in 1990. It is estimated that only after 1990 will real decline of population begin to take place.

Although the rate of population growth will decline, it should be noted that on the contrary the population of working age (between 15 and 56 years of age) is bound to increase due to the fact that persons born during the period of rapid population growth will reach the working age during the later period while the birth rate declines. The rate of population growth of those of working age will reach as high as 1.9 per cent. In addition to this, there are 640,000 persons registered as unemployed and 1,200,000 persons registered as employment seekers, besides a large number who are under-employed. Japan faces the problem of providing employment for them.

In order to absorb both the newly created and the unemployed labor forces, the country's gross national production has to be in-

creased at an annual rate of 6.5 per cent. The pre-war rate of increase of gross national production was about 4 per cent; this was considered comparatively high. During the post-war period, 1952-1956, the rate ran at about 9 per cent on the basis of the figures of gross national production in 1951; these were extremely low due to war destruction. From these facts, the rate of 6.5 per cent is estimated as rather unrealistic, but still the rate has to be maintained if Japan tries to solve her unemployment problem.

However, it is a required condition for Japan to depend on import of raw materials because her natural resources are too limited for economic development at the rate estimated above. The recent increase in the proportion of import against her national income explains her economic position. The proportion of import to national income has been increased from 8.6 per cent in 1950 to 12.8 per cent in 1956. It would be interesting to mention the recent increase of imported materials.

During the years from 1950 to 1956, the proportion of imported materials to domestic materials has been increased as follows: coal from 24.1 per cent to 34 per cent; iron ores from 64 per cent to 87.4 per cent and scrap iron from 0.4 per cent to 82 per cent. Salt, sugar, cotton, wool, rubber and oil are also dependent on import. These imports will continue to be expanded as long as Japan's economic development continues, although she has to strive for export to maintain equilibrium of balance of payment.

The proportion of exports to total production in 1956 shows the following percentages by item: cotton textiles 36 per cent, rayon textiles 47.5 per cent, galvanized iron plate 38 per cent, rails 31.6 per cent, shipbuilding 72.5 per cent, sewing machines 78 per cent and potteries 54.7 per cent. Notwithstanding these figures, the quantum index of export is still less than the pre-war level. Taking the index for the years 1934-1937 as 100, it was 86 in 1956, the year in which the exports reached a post-war peak. The same index in the United Kingdom amounted to 182 in 1956 taking the 1937-1938 average

as 100 while in Germany it was 257 as against the year 1937 taken as 100.

If Japan is determined to raise gross national production at the annual rate of 6.5 per cent in order to solve her unemployment problem, she has to increase the amount of import from \$3,050,000 realized in 1956 to \$4,230,000 in 1962, while export must be increased during the same period from \$2,495,000 to \$4,222,000. In other words, import has to be expanded 38.3 per cent and export 77.2 per cent during these five years.

Such a trade expansion will involve certain difficulties because world economy with its ups and downs will not allow only optimistic views. But we believe that science and technology will eventually bring about higher standards of living and will continue to expand new markets. Transport development will bring the world markets closer to one another both in time and space, thus increasing both the amounts and opportunities of trading. Further development of production methods and improved management will expand the markets for materials and products.

Through such economic progress, commodities will be further diversified. If Japan's export of canned tuna fish and cotton textiles dwindles, it will be replaced by the increasing export of small-sized cars and of cameras. Even at present, iron ore is imported from more than ten countries.

For the moment, Japan is engaged in trade mostly with the United States and the Southeast Asian countries because these two regions together provide for 42.9 per cent of exports and 50 per cent of imports. However, there is a gradual increase in trade with regions other than the United States and Southeast Asia. A recent trend shows a gradual increase in trade with the other regions from 53.6 per cent to 57.1 per cent of the total export and from 46.5 per cent to 50 per cent of the total import. In assessing the future of Japan, it will be important to seek economic development through international cooperation to pave the way toward a reasonable solution for her population difficulties.

"... Japan can be expected to maintain a looser association with the free nations while working for a relaxation of tensions with the Communist bloc," according to this specialist. What will this mean for the West? "There is every indication that Japan desires to minimize its Western ties and to reappear on the international scene as an "Asian power" and a "spokesman for Asia."

Japan and the West

BY PAUL F. LANGER

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THE objectives we are trying to attain are the same. But in the complicated and changing tides of international affairs there may be occasion when we might have to change our course temporarily in accordance with weather conditions.

Foreign Minister Aichihiro Fujiyama in Washington, D. C., on September 25, 1957.

Until 1952, the United States spoke for Japan, an occupied country that lacked a voice of its own in international affairs. Japanese national interests tended to be obscured by, subordinated to, or even identified with those of the United States. Japan's foreign policy was made in Washington rather than in Tokyo. When the peace treaty came into force in April, 1952, Japan regained its freedom of action and during the past six years has achieved an important place on the international scene.

What course will Japan steer in the future? What are its objectives in regard to the United States and the larger community of Western nations? An answer to these questions is all the more significant as we enter an era of East-West military stalemate and of an increasing realization of the interdependence of the free nations. In 1958, after a phenomenal economic recovery, Japan is

a major ally of the United States and an active member of the United Nations.

Like other nations, Japan's relations with the outside world are the product of complex interacting forces—economic, political, military, ideological, historical and cultural—which constantly vary in their specific weight and impact upon each other, yet respond, if at times only slowly, to the changing realities of the domestic and international situation. In analyzing Japan's policy toward the West, however, it is essential to recognize that among these many determinants the economic factor is the most significant today.

* * *

At present Japan is the largest buyer of United States agricultural commodities (\$2 billion in 5 years) and is second only to Canada in total purchases from us. The United States, on the other hand, is by far the biggest importer of Japanese goods—\$650 million out of a total Japanese export of \$3 billion. Tentative figures show that in 1957, as in previous years, Japan's exports to the United States represented about 20 per cent of her total sales abroad, while imports from the United States amounted to 40 per cent of her purchases. Thus, for every dollar we spent in Japan, the Japanese spent two dollars in this country.

Obviously Japan must try to fill this dollar gap and right the imbalance by expanding exports to the United States. But such attempts have encountered strong United

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States resistance, have generally been unsuccessful and have caused friction, minor crises and resentment. Another solution might be to reduce imports from the United States and seek suitable sources of supply elsewhere. Even if economically feasible, this would create new problems, for under present conditions the logical trade partners would have to be sought in the Communist sphere, and American pressure discourages such an approach.

Japan's annual adverse balance of payments has been covered in the past by expenditures for the United States armed forces in Japan and by offshore purchases for third countries. This situation is particularly unsatisfactory from the Japanese point of view since it forms at best a temporary and thus unsound basis for their economy and increases at the same time the politically undesirable dependence on the United States armed forces in and around Japan.

The problem created by Japanese exports of tuna, toys china and cotton goods is well known. What is less known is that in 1957 Japanese exports to the United States of cotton textiles amounted to a mere two per cent of American consumption, while during that same period Japan purchased five times more raw cotton in this country than it resold in the form of the finished cotton product. It cannot be denied, however, that certain parts of the American economy have been flooded with specialized Japanese imports. Stainless steel tableware is a recent case in point. As a result of the spectacular 1300 per cent increase in exports in four years, Japanese exporters in 1957 had cornered close to 50 per cent of the American market. A congressman from Connecticut, representing the threatened local industry, appealed to the Tariff Commission, which in turn recommended to the President in January of this year that tariff rates be raised to 40 per cent. As the United States government faces the need for an extension by Congress of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement, it is widely feared in Japan that this recommendation will be accepted. Such crises are likely to recur as long as the United States is unwilling to maintain a liberalized tariff.

In attempting to minimize this kind of friction Japan resorts to voluntary export controls, explores continuously the American market for fields less likely to antagonize American industry and emphasizes diversification of exports. Yet, both countries are coming to realize that a broadening of the United States market for Japanese exports will at best be a slow process and that the solution must lie largely in the expansion of old and the discovery of new markets.

At this time none of Japan's trade partners other than the United States buys more than four per cent of Japanese exports, and consistent efforts are being made to raise this percentage. Japan's participation in the Colombo Plan has already strengthened its trade position. Admission to the 37-nation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with a strong assist from the United States has further enhanced Japan's opportunities in the world market. Here as in other areas progress is slow, however. Despite a persistent fight by the United States against the application of Article 35, 15 contracting members continue under this escape clause to refuse to grant to Japan full GATT privileges. More direct means of United States support for the Japanese economy have included loans, investments and technological assistance contracts, which have sometimes given rise in Japan to accusations of "American imperialism."

The search for new markets has led Japanese businessmen to all the continents. The highly industrialized countries of Western Europe seem far less promising than the British dominions and the former colonies. The passing of time and a general improvement of relations with the British areas have allayed some fears, and the British Commonwealth nations are at long last seriously considering full application of GATT to Japan.

Thus Australian Prime Minister Menzies recently declared: "This government has long realized we must live in the world with Japan on the basis of friendship," and Premier Kishi's good will tour through the Pacific dominions at the end of last year was marred by only a few incidents. That Japanese importers were at the same time bidding for one fourth of Australia's wool

crop was certainly not unrelated to this improvement in relations. But Japan faces the problem of a huge imbalance of trade with Australia, as with the United States: in 1956 it imported \$208 million worth of Australian goods against exports of a mere \$36 million. Vigorous Japanese attempts to sell construction machinery to the Australians for their ambitious plans to develop the natural wealth of that continent are beginning to meet with some success. The long-range prospects are certainly hopeful. This applies even more to India; the complementary nature of the two economies augurs well for the joint development of Indian iron ore resources.

Latin America has always been of particular interest to Japan; it is virtually the only outlet for Japanese emigration and at the same time may provide eventually almost as attractive a market as Asia. Emigrants to Latin America numbered 8,000 in 1957, with 13,000 scheduled to go there next year. Brazil absorbs the largest contingent, followed by Paraguay and, less important, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia and Argentina. Negotiations are under way with Paraguay to provide that country with a loan for the building of a merchant fleet in Japan in exchange for a quota of 5,000 Japanese immigrants a year. In Brazil, on the other hand, Japan last year made its largest post-war foreign investment when 18 Japanese companies underwrote the construction of a steel mill with a capacity of one half million tons.

In recent months, Japanese economic diplomacy has proved increasingly active and ingenious, penetrating even into spheres hitherto the domain of Western business. Japanese negotiators have appeared with attractive offers in the capitals of the new nations of Asia and Africa and in the oil-rich areas of the Middle East. With the approval of its government a Tokyo mission is getting ready to discuss with President Nasser Japanese participation in the construction of the Aswan Dam. A recent understanding between Japan and Saudi

Arabia will give the latter a 56 per cent cut of the profits, as against 50 per cent under prevailing agreements with the United States, and it is reported that Saudi Arabia plans to reconsider its agreements with American companies. At the same time Japanese oil companies are trying to outbid the American oil man, H. L. Hunt, in the Kuwait area. Similar Japanese activities in Iran, supposedly with United States backing, have aroused dark suspicions in England.¹

American financial assistance for a Japanese-sponsored development program for Southeast Asia forms a vital part of Prime Minister Kishi's economic plans, but for a variety of reasons the Southeast Asian response has been less than overwhelming. Though favorable in principle and recognizing Southeast Asia as "Japan's natural trading area"² the United States is unlikely soon to go beyond President Eisenhower's cautious promise to study the question. Here as in other instances Japan is somewhat disappointed by the gap between American agreement in principle and readiness to act.

Japan's trade relations with the Communist bloc have been discussed elsewhere. The point must be made, however, that this issue represents one of the most conspicuous areas of disagreement between the United States and Japan. A modification of the United States position in 1957 that freed Japan from certain restrictions in dealing with Communist China has met some of the Japanese objections. The tenuous line which Japan is toeing was illustrated on March 4 of last year when two Chinese economic missions arrived at Tokyo airport within ten minutes of each other—one from Taiwan and the other from Communist China.

* * *

In recent years most of the open differences which have developed between Japan and the West have revolved around the question of Japan's security and the role of the United States in this matter.

The American position on this issue can be stated in a few words. The Japanese islands are of vital strategic importance to the defense of the Free World. With its vast industrial potential, Japan is an arsenal almost as valuable to the West as it would be to the Communist bloc. Hence Japan

¹ See, for instance, "Iran: U.S.-Japanese Oil Bargain," *Eastern World*, London, January, 1958, pp. 21-22.

² Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, "America's Responsibility in the Far East," *The Department of State Bulletin*, June 24, 1957, p. 997.

must be securely anchored to the United States, which alone can protect it from Communist domination.

In line with this evaluation, the United States since 1951 has concluded with Japan a series of treaties and agreements that legalize the stationing of American forces in and around Japan, that guarantee the necessary control over a number of Japanese and outlying bases and that bind the two nations in a defensive military alliance. The national interests of both Japan and the United States are considered to be served thereby.

Japanese popular reaction to the problem of national security is not so easy to define. It is compounded of fear of involvement in war, pacifist sentiments, apprehension that rearmament would drastically reduce the living standard of the nation, a general lack of sympathy with Soviet-style communism (accompanied, however, by a rather optimistic view of the chances of Communist aggression against Japan), growing anti-American Asia-oriented nationalism, and elements of sober recognition that close ties with the United States are valuable for more than just economic considerations.

The way in which these contradictory ingredients are mixed depends on the international situation and on the political affiliation of the individual concerned. It may range from a position of absolute pacifism and outright opposition to the American alliance through varying shades of neutralism to a reluctant realization of the need for the present security arrangement. The first two positions describe the bulk of the opposition Socialists. The last position probably characterizes the feelings of a majority of the Japanese people today, certainly most of the Conservatives and especially their leaders, from Hatoyama to Ishibashi to the present Prime Minister Kishi.

This curious, though by no means incomprehensible, state of mind obviously tends to create difficulties in Japan's relations with the United States, particularly so since under the postwar democratic governments public opinion exerts a considerable influence. Popular emotions, whether spontaneous or politically inspired, thus are likely to force even cautious, realistically-

minded Conservatives into assuming occasionally a stance of opposition to American defense policies.

When such emotions rise to the proportions of a national movement, however, as in the case of Okinawa, or in the matter of nuclear weapons, even a Conservative, pro-American government has little choice but to bend with the wind. On the other hand, it must be realized that this pressure of public opinion, which undoubtedly exists, can also serve as an effective diplomatic argument in scaling down American demands for a more active rearmament of Japan.

For several years now Japan has maintained a small "Self-Defense Force" (at present some 200,000 men), largely supported out of United States funds. The shouldering of a greater share in these defense expenditures has been resisted quite tenaciously by successive Japanese governments on the grounds that Japan's precariously sustained equilibrium might otherwise be disturbed. Even the budget surplus in 1957 has resulted in only minor concessions on this point. For combating internal subversion the present forces are deemed ample.

On the other hand, recent weapons developments, added to the existence of an anti-war clause in the Japanese constitution and a general popular opposition to outright rearmament, have sown doubts even among the Conservatives as to the usefulness of a larger military apparatus to counter aggression from the outside. The orbiting sputniks and an uneasy feeling that the Soviet Union now possesses ballistic superiority can hardly inspire the Japanese with enthusiasm for active rearmament. For the time being, then, the Conservative government is likely to recognize the wisdom of maintaining some degree of armed force. It may even see fit to modernize or slightly strengthen these forces in response to American pressure *cum* persuasion. But the question of size and financial responsibility for Japan's self-defense forces will continue to be a source of mild United States-Japanese friction.

More acutely serious for the future of Japan's relations with the West is the whole complex of questions entailed by the sta-

tioning of United States forces on Japanese soil. There are, of course, the more obvious reasons for trouble: the requisitioning of farm lands for the construction of air strips, local antagonism, nationalism. But more disturbing perhaps than these surface irritations is the widely held view that United States bases, instead of protecting the security of the nation, will attract the Soviet lightning and turn the country into a battlefield.

One cannot say that public opinion is undivided on this issue. There is recognition in some quarters—shared by the government—that the presence of American bases at the time of the Korean War prevented a disaster for non-Communist Asia and that they ensure continued Japanese independence. But as in the matter of rearmament, Japanese policy is one of cautious ambiguity. Japan does not intend to remove the American protective screen, but it would like to render it less conspicuous and provocative, reducing its size without impairing its effectiveness.

In the eyes of the Japanese and of many Americans, United States ground forces in Japan by 1957 had outlived their usefulness. The celebrated incident last year of the United States soldier, William S. Girard, who fired a shot which killed a Japanese woman and thereby involved both nations in a surge of emotions, glaringly illustrated the problematic nature of American bases on foreign soil. President Eisenhower's promise to visiting Premier Kishi, in June, 1957, to withdraw all United States ground combat troops from Japan within a year was merely a recognition of this sentiment on both sides of the Pacific. Today, without endangering Japan's security, most of these troops have been withdrawn, leaving only air and navy units on Japanese soil. A major source of friction has thus been removed.

The settlement of the thorny Okinawa question, however, is still in its initial stage. Under the provisions of the peace treaty, Japan agreed to leave the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands under United States administering authority. In 1958, the strategic island of Okinawa (almost equidistant from Japan, South Korea, Communist China and Taiwan) continues under American military

government, although Japan's "residual sovereignty" has been officially recognized. For the same reasons as in Japan, opposition to United States bases has developed in Okinawa in recent years more strongly perhaps because of the continued existence of American control even after the peace treaty, the unusually large area occupied by military installations (one fifth of the total cultivable area), American insistence on terms of compensation unsatisfactory to the Okinawa farmer, and the repercussion of an irredentist movement assiduously cultivated by Leftists and nationalists in Okinawa and Japan. The reverberations of this conflict of interest are felt so strongly that rather than being a huge aircraft carrier floating on calm seas, the island is today the principal storm center of United States-Japanese relations.

The case of Okinawa is symptomatic of the difficulties which arise when democratic principles clash with nationalism and military exigencies. As President Eisenhower and any number of American officials have made crystal-clear, the island is a keystone of our Pacific defenses. We do not intend to withdraw from Okinawa nor do we wish to share its administration with Japan. At the same time we have attempted to foster a democratic regime. But democratic regimes under long years of foreign tutelage are likely to turn against the irremovable tutor. This has been our fate.

In 1956, the pro-Communist leader of the "back-to-Japan" movement was elected mayor of the island's capital under the very eyes of the United States authorities. As friction developed, the American commander eventually felt compelled to amend by fiat the city charter in order to remove the anti-American mayor. The move was perhaps neither diplomatic nor democratic. It certainly was not effective.

In January, 1958, two candidates both running on an anti-American platform faced each other in the mayoralty contest. The pro-Communist, the more radical proponent of nationalism, rapidly rose in popular favor ("like a sputnik" as his backer, the ousted mayor, put it) and finally won. The new mayor since has called on the United States to "establish democratic rule in Oki-

nawa" and has vowed to "fight against American pressure."

Perhaps one should not overestimate this blow to American prestige nor exaggerate the practical implications of this event. If anything the case does show, however, that some adjustment would seem in order, preferably a mutually acceptable United States-Japanese compromise reinforced by a policy which would take greater account of the local sources of dissatisfaction.

Other delicate issues troubling our relations with Japan are the stockpiling and testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Ever since Hiroshima, the Japanese have been understandably sensitive to these problems. The death in 1954 of a Japanese fisherman which was attributed to the radioactive fallout from the United States testing grounds in the Pacific has further aroused public opinion. The Kishi government has recently reiterated its pledge to the Japanese people not to allow missile bases in Japan nor to accept nuclear weapons. It may however be compelled to recognize technological progress and modernize the Japanese defense forces, especially if encouraged to do so by the United States. Such a reversal of policy might produce real opposition in Japan and stir up a serious political crisis.

The prohibition of nuclear tests and of the manufacturing of superweapons will undoubtedly be among the major objectives of any Japanese government. Such a policy might give rise to conflicts with the United States, if only perhaps in the realm of public declarations. Already the Japanese government has taken the lead in pressing for the prohibition of nuclear tests, for this is one issue where it has the full backing of the Japanese people and the sympathy of the world.

* * *

An analysis of Japan's approach to some of the major questions in its relations with the Western world, as outlined in this review, suggests the direction in which Japan is likely to move. Obviously such an appraisal is at the mercy of any drastic change in the domestic or international balance of power. If we assume that no such drastic

change will occur—and to the writer at least this seems a rather safe assumption—certain conclusions would appear to emerge.

Depending on the brand of their conservatism successive Japanese governments may vary in emphasis, but they will all no doubt broaden vigorously Japan's economic, political and cultural contacts not only throughout the Western and the neutral worlds, but also with the Communist world. This may bring Japan into conflict at times with Western policies, but should not result in any real break with the West. Rather, Japan can be expected to maintain a looser association with the free nations while working for a relaxation of tensions with the Communist bloc.

This policy would lead to a somewhat changed relationship with the United States, characterized by increasing independence, the degree of which would be a function primarily of Japan's success in opening up non-American markets. Stronger Japanese pressure for a revision of its military arrangements with the West must be anticipated, but a move into the pacifist, neutralist camp appears improbable.

Japan may well become a force working effectively toward a lessening of international tensions. In this respect it will perhaps occupy a place somewhat nearer to the Western viewpoint than India represents today within the East-West spectrum.

There is every indication that Japan desires to minimize its Western ties and to reappear on the international scene as an "Asian power" and a "spokesman for Asia." From the days of the Bandung Conference to the recent Afro-Asian Congress in Cairo, wherever the word "Asia" is heard, Japan's delegates appear, and they are not necessarily of the Left. But still in attempting to build a bridge between East and West, Japan intends to stand firmly on the Asian shore. This is the message Kishi had for the world when he greeted the New Year:

There are situations when one cannot simply assume that Japan's position as a nation of Asia and her stand as one of the free nations will be identical. In such circumstances if a choice must be made I think Japan must approach the problem from the viewpoint of Asia.⁸

⁸ *Asahi Shimbun*, January 1, 1958.

Declaring that "if Japan is to be defended by action on our part, there is little doubt that we must move beyond the essentially negative, military policy of containment, and beyond even the studied skills of technical and formal diplomacy, this specialist advises that we provide "foreign economic aid," "expand our informational and cultural programs," and improve the quality of our diplomatic personnel sent there.

Japan's Relations with the Communist World

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AMERICANS, like many other Westerners, think of international relations within the familiar rationale of a states system which stretches back at least to the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648. Thus we tend to insist that the vital—sometimes, the sole—plane of communications lies on the formal level of state-to-state contact. In this context, experts measure the presence or absence of contact by the right of legation. Most of us think of it as just plain diplomacy.

True, our leaders often speak almost wistfully of peoples-to-peoples contact. Nevertheless, we are far more comfortable when we put on the formal Western garb of state-to-state, government-to-government, legal, diplomatic, *de jure* contact with legitimate governments.

Even before the end of the Occupation of Japan, Americans returned to judgments on Japan's foreign relations in terms of diplomacy and the military strategy of states, this time of mainly two very large states. Japan's relations with the Communist world, however, must be understood on a far broader front. The Japanese and other peoples in East Asia had long been familiar with other methods of contact beside formal, legal, or diplomatic methods. In fact, with a view to the past and a hesitant glance at the future, we might hazard the guess that Western nation-state-type diplomacy may well occupy only a brief span on the total time chart of the international relations of East Asia. Japan's relations with China—even Communist China—have as background two thousand years of regional proximity, historical community, cultural interchange, and the movements of peoples and ideas; they have had only a very grim 100 years of Western-type diplomacy.

Japan's relations with both the People's Republic and the Soviet Union, as Communist states, are conditioned by the fact that Russia, between 1945 and 1957, and China, today, have never allowed the lack of diplomatic contact to stand in the way of cross-fertilization through ideas, propaganda, enticements, pressures, cultural inter-

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¹ In preparing this article, I am grateful for discussions in my graduate seminars on Political Problems of the Far East: 1955-1956, on the International Status of Japan: 1957-1958, on the Impact of Communism on East Asian Politics; and for my research assistant, Mr. Walter Kall, whose support is provided by the Rutgers Research Council.

change, sports or even trade. Here, Communist states have a great advantage: they work on several planes of international politics.

One other matter must remain uppermost in the minds of Americans, thinking about Japan's relations with the Communist states and with us. Since the early days of the Occupation reforms, when we did use other tools, the major American instrument of persuasion in the Japan theatre has been armed force: American troops, including General MacArthur and Mr. Girard, American aircraft, and the American navy. (Less obvious has been the invisible factor in the Japanese balance of payments, particularly the annual \$600 million special procurement.) In contrast, Japanese have yet to see a Russian or Chinese Communist soldier on Japanese soil. Therefore, we should not be surprised when many Japanese credit the Communist bloc with peaceful intentions, while suspecting us of war-mindedness.²

On the other hand, it is cause for wonder that contacts between Japan and the Communist states are so varied, in light of the legal and diplomatic status of Japan in Communist eyes. In a real sense, Japan is still defined as the aggressor suspect, the unregenerate fascist enemy of World War II. Beginning in 1951 at San Francisco, some 47 nations signed and have since ratified a majority peace treaty with Japan; some, like India and Yugoslavia, did not attend the peace conference but have terminated the state of war; neutral nations have also restored diplomatic contact. As the Japanese themselves put it, "Therefore, with the exception of the Soviet Union and its satellites, practically all the countries of the world welcome our independence."³

Since that statement, of course, the Soviet Union (as well as Czechoslovakia and Poland) has restored relations by means of exchange of representatives. Japan still has no relations at all with 11 nations (including

Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania). Japan remains in diplomatic contact with China, but with the Republic of China on Taiwan, not the People's Republic of China on the mainland.⁴

Furthermore, despite all the Communist blandishments, Japan's status to this day remains in the context of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, February 14, 1950, whereby the two powers agreed "jointly to prevent the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and the repetition of aggression on the part of Japan, or any state which directly or indirectly would unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression." On several occasions, the Chinese Communists have offered to intercede with the U.S.S.R. in an attempt to modify this open reference to Japan and veiled allusion to the United States, but the price is a treaty with mainland China. Indeed, as late as the Sino-Soviet Declaration of 1954, although the two governments expressed readiness to take steps to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan, they also demanded as a prerequisite that Japan sever her security arrangements with the United States.

Negotiations with Russia

Nevertheless, following a promise made by Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro to re-establish relations with Russia, and after Soviet overtures, conversations toward a peace treaty were commenced in London in 1955. Early in 1956, they were completely stalled over territorial issues, chiefly disposition of the Kuriles (discussed below), and the repatriation of prisoners of war, estimated by the Japanese at between 10,000 and 13,000. In July, 1956, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru arrived in Moscow at the head of a delegation to resume negotiations. The Russians flatly refused to discuss the status of even the southern Kuriles, and offered to apply the "German formula" to the repatriation issue, namely, to return some 1100 prisoners (the Russian estimate) after relations were normalized. By September, clearly the most the Japanese could get was an agreement to sidestep territorial issues entirely, and to restore diplomatic relations. In October, Prime Minister Hato-

² This point is well underscored by the Hon. Ernest A. Gross, in his Foreword to *Japan Between East and West* (New York: 1957). This volume is the product of six experts and a special seminar, held at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956, in which I was privileged to participate. See also page 237 of this issue.

³ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau. *Japan: Her Security and Mission* (Tokyo April 28, 1952), pp. 1-2.

⁴ *Japan Between East and West*, op. cit., Appendix, pp. 313-314.

yama himself arrived in Moscow to see if he could wring out more concessions.

The long and tortuous negotiations were finally concluded, somewhat unsatisfactorily for Japan, on October 19, 1956. In place of a peace treaty, a Joint Declaration was signed by Premier Hatoyama and Premier Nikolai Bulganin, providing for termination of the state of war, exchange of diplomatic representatives, Soviet support of Japan's United Nations application for membership, and agreements on commerce, sea rescue, and fishing. In Tokyo, December 12, 1956, 11 years and 4 months after the end of the war, Russia and Japan exchanged ratifications of the agreement.⁵

Normalization of relations with Russia was the key which opened the door to membership in the United Nations; on this plane too the Japanese have made contact with Communist states, although not with the People's Republic of China. From the beginning, but especially in the Twelfth General Assembly, Japan threw herself into the forefront of the struggle over disarmament and the control of nuclear testing. On September 23, 1957, Ambassador Matsudaira submitted a draft proposal which recommended provisional suspension of nuclear tests while disarmament talks proceeded. Nine nations of the Soviet bloc and the Western powers opposed and defeated the resolution.

⁵ By protocols signed in February, 1957, normal relations were reestablished with Poland and with Czechoslovakia. Complete details may be found in the author's articles on "Japan," *Britannica Book of the Year, 1957*, and . . . 1958 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1957 and 1958). For the text of the Russo-Japanese Peace Declaration, see *Current History*, January, 1957, p. 49.

⁶ Japan's position in the U.N. is completely set forth in *The Consular General of Japan, Japan Report* (New York), vol. III, no. 16 (Sept. 25, 1957); vol. IV, no. 1 (Jan. 1, 1958).

⁷ *Yomiuri*, Dec. 27, 1957, cited in American Embassy, Tokyo, *Daily Summary of Japanese Press* (mimeo.) Dec. 27, 1957; hereinafter cited as *DS*.

⁸ The Kuriles are composed of 30-odd small islands, located between Hokkaido and the Kamchatka Peninsula and spread over 750 miles. By a treaty of 1855 Russia acquired all isles north of Uruppu and Japan retained Kunashiri and Etorofu in the south. By the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1875, Japan obtained possession of the isles north of Uruppu and abandoned Sakhalin. About 10,000 Japanese, as well as Ainu under Japanese rule, came to live in the Kuriles and to regard them as a permanent residence. Shikotan and the Habomais lie just off Hokkaido's Nemuro Peninsula. Japan regained southern Sakhalin (or Karafuto) by the Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905. Japanese residents there came to number more than 400,000. In summary, at no time in history have Shikotan and the Habomais been foreign territory; Kunashiri and Etorofu have never been owned by Russia; southern Sakhalin has changed hands several times. See Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau, *The Northern Islands; Background of Territorial Problems in the Japanese-Soviet Negotiations* (Tokyo, 1955).

In a comment of December 14, on a memorandum sent by the U.S.S.R. to all members of the United Nations, Kondo Shinkichi, Director of the Foreign Ministry's Public Information Bureau, declared that the Soviet Union "should not censure the West alone for the deadlock on the disarmament issue but should, under the new international situation, reconsider its stand and discuss the issue within the framework of the United Nations."⁸ At long last, the rather idealistic stand of Japan, which naturally stemmed from her own experience as an atomic victim, was being tested in the cold winds on the slopes of the summit of atomic diplomacy.

Despite the so-called normalization of relations with Russia and the subsequent success in attaining U.N. membership, outstanding issues give Japanese cause to wonder where is the profit in coming to agreement with the U.S.S.R. The Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri*⁷ singled out the problem of repatriation of prisoners of war as the issue deserving of deepest sympathy by Japanese and their Government. Other problems include the unresolved territorial issue, fishing rights and trade.

As has been noted, the Russo-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 completely sidestepped territorial issues centering on Southern Sakhalin (called Karafuto by the Japanese), the Kuriles and adjacent islands.⁸ The strength of Japanese claims on these areas varies, but with regard to the southern Kuriles (Kunashiri and Etorofu) and adjacent groups (Shikotan and the Habomai Islands), Japan cites powerful reasons why historically, geographically, economically, administratively and ethnically, they should revert to Japan.

The Potsdam Proclamation, it is true, had defined Japanese territory to be made up of four main and a thousand immediately adjacent islands, with those at issue excluded. The Yalta Agreement stipulated that southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and adjacent islands would be handed over to Russia but, of course, Japan was not a party to Yalta and the American Secretary of State has since declared that such promises could not be fulfilled in light of Russia's own repeated violation of Yalta's terms. In any

case, since 1945 these territories have remained occupied by the U.S.S.R., which admitted them to the Union in an independent Sakhalin district by constitutional amendment, February 26, 1947.

At San Francisco in 1951, Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko, and in London in 1955, negotiator Jacob Malik, maintained the view that the Soviet Union had come to exercise sovereignty over these territories. In the terms of the peace treaty, Article 2(c), "Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the Kurile Islands and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of her Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905." The Japanese position, however, is that neither Yalta nor the peace treaty explicitly clarified the disposition of the islands; that the peace treaty names no legal beneficiary to the islands; and that, in any case, Russia did not sign the treaty.⁹ Such arguments, even after resumption of diplomatic relations, have been to no avail. Russia has promised to return, in due course, only Shikotan and the Habomais.

Closely related to the territorial issue in the North Pacific, and important as an aspect of economic rivalry greatly intensified during the past decade, is the struggle over

use of fishing grounds, particularly outside territorial waters. On the one hand, the economic and dietary needs of Japan depend greatly on such fishing. On the other, Japanese methods have always caused ill will even in the United States.¹⁰

After normalization of relations and further negotiations marked by twists and turns, Japan and Russia came to tentative agreement on fishing regulations for the Northwest Pacific early in 1957. Later in the year, however, Japan and Russia sharply disagreed over the latter's announcement that Japanese vessels would be barred from vast Peter the Great Bay, on the assumption that it was Russian territorial water. Late in the year, Japanese delegates pessimistically approached the second fishing negotiations scheduled for Moscow in January, 1958. The entire situation caused the newspaper *Tokyo Shimbun* to "wonder of what use is it that we have restored diplomatic relations with Soviet Union."¹¹

Japan has fared a little better in trade negotiations. Japanese trade with the Soviet Union was small even before the war, averaging \$20-25 million. After the war, volume plummeted¹² so that in 1956 Japan's exports to the Soviet Union were only 0.03 per cent of its total exports; its imports from the U.S.S.R., only 0.09 per cent of total imports. Even conservative financial papers like *Nihon Keizai*, however, argued that too great dependence on the United States was dangerous, and that Japan should try to expand trade with the Soviet Union regardless of its political structure and ideology.

After three months' difficult negotiation, Japan and the U.S.S.R. signed a trade agreement in December, 1957. This provided for a payments agreement based on a cash-settlement formula, reciprocal most favored nation treatment, and diplomatic immunities for the Soviet Trade Mission. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry estimated exports from Japan, during the first year, at only \$20-25 million. Trade promotion would depend a great deal on the pattern of development of Siberia, as part of the Soviet sixth five-year plan. The Ministry estimated imports at about \$20-23 million, confined mainly to lumber from northern areas and coal from Sakhalin.¹³

⁹ It may be of interest to note here the parallel, but slightly different status of Okinawa. Japan promised to concur in a U.S. proposal to the U.N. for a trusteeship under sole U.S. administration over all the Ryukyu Islands, but such a proposal has never been made. American occupation continues in what may develop as the "American Cyprus"; Japanese have been encouraged to think they exercise "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa. Meanwhile, if the Russians were shrewd enough to hand back a large area of the Kuriles, the American position on Okinawa would be embarrassing.

¹⁰ The Bristol Bay controversy with America in the 1930's, for example. In the post-war period, the peace treaty (Art. 9) guaranteed Japan's fishing rights in general; final arrangements between the U.S., Canada, and Japan were made at a conference, November 5-December 14, 1951.

¹¹ *Nihon Keizai*, Dec. 20, 1957; *Sankei Jiji*, Dec. 26, 1957; *Mainichi*, Jan. 4, 1958; *Yomiuri*, Jan. 10, 1958; and *Tokyo Shimbun*, Dec. 30, 1957. *DS*, Dec. 20, 1957-Jan. 10, 1958.

¹² The following table is drawn from *Tokyo Shimbun*, Dec. 7, 1957, *DS*, Dec. 10, 1957, in turn based on estimates of customs statistics:

Post-war Russo-Japanese Trade		
(years)	Exports	Imports
	(in \$1,000.)	
1950	722	738
1951	0	28
1952	152	459
1953	7	2,100
1954	38	2,249
1955	2,076	3,052
1956	759	2,869

¹³ *Tokyo Shimbun*, Dec. 6, 1957; *Nihon Keizai*, Dec. 5, 1957; *DS*, Dec. 5, 10, 1957.

Japan and Red China

If Japan's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union have proved to be difficult, formal relations with the People's Republic of China have so far been impossible. At the time of the elections in 1955, almost all groups in Japan—the Liberals of Yoshida Shigeru, the Democrats of Hatoyama, Left and Right wing Socialists—were in favor of expansion of trade with the Chinese Communists and even recognition of the Peking regime.¹⁴ Kawasaki labor unions and Osaka businessmen concurred in seeking wider contacts.

Popular attitudes included faith that the Japanese, with pre-war civilian and military experience, knew how to handle the Chinese. Another factor was the strong desire for trade with a potential market of half a billion people. Furthermore, as we shall see, China's propaganda strategy seemed to parallel the strongest desires of Japan: to regain close contacts with all of Asia, to be independent of the West, to be free of militarism, and to be assured of peace. From the Chinese side, lack of recognition of Peking was a barrier to getting through to the Japanese people.

Japan's participation in the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, April, 1955, marked a turning point. Japanese delegates made clear their dislike of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, directed at Japan. In first talks with the Chinese, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, head of the Japanese delegation, expressed concern over the reiterated theme that the Japanese Government was only a puppet of imperialist America. In his famous speech to the Political Committee, April 23, 1955, Premier Chou En-lai announced:

We have also told the delegation of Japan that we respect the choice made by the Japanese

people. When the Japanese people chose the Yoshida Government we recognized that Government as representing the Japanese people. Now the Japanese have chosen the Hatoyama Government, and we recognize that Government as representative of the Japanese people.¹⁵

Nonetheless, in his address to the Diet, January 30, 1956, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu expressed the official position that Japan, having recognized the Nationalist Government on Taiwan, could not recognize the Peking regime at the same time.¹⁶ Now clearly the Taiwan aspect of Japan's policy is of far greater significance to the mainland Chinese. Thus when, in September, 1957, General Chang Chun, special envoy of President Chiang K'ai-shek, arrived in Tokyo on the invitation of Premier Kishi, the reaction of Peking was sharp.

A Japanese Socialist Party mission headed by Suzuki Yoshio was personally told by Premier Chou En-lai that, as long as Japan recognized two Chinas, Peking would strive to restore relations only through interchange between peoples. International law, said Chou, is outmoded in any case: when two peoples want to get along in friendly fashion, their Governments prevent them from doing so. China, he added, has waited 8 years but could wait 80 years. Obviously, Peking appeared not too perturbed by Premier Kishi's unreadiness to enter into diplomatic relations.¹⁷ Nevertheless, pressure in Japan for contact with mainland China continued to build, and the *Sankei Jiji* of December 9, 1957, predicted that the Government would enter diplomatic negotiations sometime in late 1958 or early 1959.

As in the Russian case, several outstanding issues embarrass even informal contact between Japan and mainland China. Investigations conducted by the Japanese have led to the claim that more than 32,000 prisoners of war have not yet been repatriated from Red China. And the Chinese too have been harassing Japanese fishermen on the high seas. Finally, even private trade with China has run into severe difficulties. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to understand the continued Japanese enthusiasm for reestablishing trade with mainland China, but it is most certainly there. For example, the old

¹⁴ *Comparative Platforms of Japan's Major Parties*, translated and arranged by Cecil H. Ueyehara, Michio & Shimako Royama, Shijuro Ogata (Boston, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1955).

¹⁵ George McT. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference; Bandung, Indonesia*, April, 1955 (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956), Appendix, p. 61.

¹⁶ "Shigemitsu Outlines Foreign Policy Aims," *Japan Report*, op. cit., Vol. II, no. 3 (Feb. 17, 1956), p. 5.

¹⁷ See Harold S. Quigley, "The Chinese-Japanese Courtship," *Current History*, vol. 33, no. 196 (Dec., 1957); *Chuo Koron* (Jan., 1958), American Embassy, Tokyo, *Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines*, Dec. 23, 1957, hereinafter cited as *JM*; also *Tokyo Shimbum*, Dec. 12, 1957, *Asahi*, Dec. 14, 1957, *Sankei Jiji*, Dec. 9, 1957, *DS*, Dec. 7-16, 1957; and *Japan Report*, op. cit., vol. III, no. 17 (Oct. 10, 1957).

conservative ex-businessman, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, put it thus:

Since these countries are near to Japan geographically, trade with them will be convenient. Japan has many smaller enterprisers who used to make a living by selling goods to China. Therefore, I think it natural that they should expect their production activities to go better if Japan reopens trade with Communist China.¹⁸

In the mid-1930's about 10 per cent of Japan's imports came from China; about 20 per cent of exports went to China. In contrast, as late as 1955, political and economic changes had reduced imports from China, Korea and Taiwan to only about 7 per cent; exports, to 5 per cent. According to Professor Jerome B. Cohen, Japanese exports to Communist China amounted to only \$28.3 million in 1955, about \$62.1 million in 1956; and imports to \$50.1 million in 1955, \$56.9 million in 1956.

It is hardly probable that the Peking regime, with its breakneck pace to industrialize and with minimum outlays on agriculture, will want to buy any significant quantity of Japanese consumer goods and textiles. China may seek Japanese capital goods and equipment, but it is difficult to see what it can give in payment, since China now plans to put every ton of coal and iron ore into its own increase in steel output. It is always possible that China, like any Communist country, may use trade as a political weapon. Although Japanese will not face up to the facts, however, the economics behind the nostalgic plan to revive the "old China trade" is at best shaky.¹⁹

In April, 1957, the United States allowed a relaxation of restrictions on trade with Communist China, and many Japanese were certain this would open the way to increased trade volume.²⁰ After 50 long days of nego-

tiation, however, a Japanese delegation headed by Ikeda Masanosuke returned to Japan on November 4, with negotiations for a private trade agreement in complete suspension. Talks were hung up over the Kishi Government's insistence that any Chinese delegation not exceed five, and that all members must be fingerprinted under the Alien Registration Law. Meanwhile, Japan's exports to China had fallen off by almost 30 per cent, from June to October. The magazine *Chuo Koron* charged the Government with a negative attitude, as compared with that of previous governments. *Mainichi* predicted that China trade would be a major political issue in a forthcoming election.²¹

Fortunately for the Chinese Communists and the Russians, as has been hinted, political influence in Japan does not rest solely on these rather ragged diplomatic contacts. Nor do the Communist powers choose to use the Japan Communist Party which, in its domestic ineptness, rivals its counterpart in the United States.²² Even the Leftist front in Japan has been confused by the policy of smiles launched at the summit in Geneva, July 1955; by the denunciation of Stalin in the Twentieth Party Congress, February, 1956; and by the true revolutions latent in Poland and Hungary. Despite these handicaps, the Communist powers are waging a ceaseless, and largely adroit, propaganda assault on Japan. Paradoxically, China—without diplomatic contact—has been far more successful than elder brother Russia—with normalized relations.

There can be no doubt that China takes seriously its psychological approach to Japan. Although the policy source is not entirely clear, Professor Martin Wilbur believes that direction comes from the very top of the Peking hierarchy: the Japan Problem Committee, including Liu Shao-ch'i, second only to Mao; Kuo Mo-jo, a famous intellectual leader who was educated in Japan; Liao Cheng-chih, Liaison Secretary, and others. For our purposes, the campaign may be said to have begun after the Soviet-China bid of October, 1954. Soon thereafter, Liao Cheng-chih visited Japan as deputy to Mme. Li Te-ch'uan, head of the Chinese Red Cross; and in the fall of 1955, Kuo Mo-jo made a

¹⁸ Kawaguchi Matsutaro, "A Talk with Aiichiro Fujiyama," *Nippon*, Jan., 1958, *JM*, Jan. 13, 1958.

¹⁹ Jerome B. Cohen, "International Aspects of Japan's Economic Situation," *Japan Between East and West*, op. cit., pp. 137-144.

²⁰ Witnesses appeared in the Upper House for the International Trade Promotion, Japan-China Export-Import, Japan-China Trade associations, *Asahi*, Dec. 11, 1957, in *DS*, Dec. 11, 1957.

²¹ *Chuo Koron*, Jan. 1958, in *JM*, Dec. 23, 1957; *Mainichi*, Jan. 8, 1958, in *DS*, Jan. 9, 1958.

²² According to a Government source, the Soviet Party recently criticized the Japan Communist Party in as sharp terms as were used by the Cominform in 1950. As a result Japanese Communists are reentering another period of agonizing self-criticism.

triumphal tour of Japan. These visits opened the floodgates and the Japanese responded with an amazing variety of delegations of newspapermen and radio broadcasters, millionaire Kuhara Fusanosuke, Diet members' missions, and many, many others.²³

Media employed by Asian Communists represent a full spectrum. Although Radio Peking has broadcast to Japan ten and a half hours a week, it is not too effective. Of greater interest were the broadcasts of "Radio Free Japan," begun May 1, 1952 and ended December 30, 1955, "since its duties had been completed." Close relationships with Chinese, North Korean, and Soviet broadcasts lines were clear, but once again, although the Japan Communist Party publicized the broadcasts, it was not always up-to-date on their contents.²⁴

Almost all the news about mainland China comes to Japanese via the New China News Agency, which in Japan uses the Communist-controlled Asia News Service. Books start in the Foreign Language Press, Peking, and find their way into Japanese bookstalls through the Asia Cultural Exchange Association. Japanese editions of *People's China* and *Pictorial China* are promoted and distributed through the branch-office organization of *Akahata*, the Japanese Communist newspaper. It was through these books and magazines that the theme of normalization of relations with the U.S.S.R. and China was hammered home.

To say that the audience, to which all this effort is directed, consists only of Communists and extreme Leftists, would be a serious mistake. Most significantly, the Japan-Red China Cultural Exchange Asso-

ciation was founded March 23, 1956, at the Industrial Club, Marunouchi, Tokyo. Officers include the former premier, Christian Socialist, and Moral Rearmament leader, Katayama Tetsu; and membership embraces 325 prominent politicians, businessmen, religious figures, scholars, artists, writers, journalists, musicians, and entertainment celebrities.²⁵ The Association has tried to remain apolitical and supra-ideological, but it has already been closely linked to the Communist-infiltrated Japan-Red China Amity Society.

On the intellectual front, interest in and demand for knowledge of the New China is amazing. This interest is fed mainly by the *Chugoku Kenkyujo* (China Research Institute) and its offspring, the *Gendai Chugoku Gakkai* (Contemporary China Research Society), with its 800 Japanese members seriously concerned with China studies. China studies societies on various campuses, for example Keio University, are flourishing. Interest in Chinese language study is perhaps even greater than that in Russian and is spread throughout universities, labor unions, and adult education circles.

Only one brake has been put on the rather idealistic response of Japanese to the rise of the New China. Whereas even businessmen, politicians, intellectuals and especially scientists have been fulsome in praise of the mainland utopia, after brief and conducted tours, Japanese newsmen and radio broadcasters, with increasingly closer looks at China, have begun to rub off the bright luster of the image.²⁶

Nevertheless, Peking has many cards and plays them well. Much of what Japanese feel about Red China is an outgrowth of long-standing attitudes which predate the Peking regime: traditional and close cultural affinity and yet a sense of superiority; remorse and guilt toward Japan's recent treatment of China; above all, a distinction between the Chinese and Russian revolutions. Professor Wilbur concluded, from Japanese public opinion polls, that although America continues to score highest as a country respected by Japanese, there is also a great deal of dislike expressed.

Communist China has not achieved widespread popularity among the respondents to the

²³ C. Martin Wilbur, "Japan and the Rise of Communist China," *Japan Between East and West*, op. cit., p. 205. For details on the Japanese side, I have relied heavily on *The Leftist Cultural Front: Its Organization and Activities*, comp. by the People's Cultural Research Association (Tokyo, March, 1956, mimeo.), which I have received courtesy of the Japan Representative of The Asia Foundation, Tokyo, Dr. Robert B. Hall.

²⁴ *Leftist Cultural Front*, op. cit., pp. 285-290.

²⁵ *Leftist Cultural Front*, op. cit., pp. 410-411. Motivation of many members is best illustrated by the statement of Nakajima Kanzo, literary critic, who visited Peking in November, 1957: "In light of experiences since the war I am confident it is imperatively necessary to promote cultural interchange between Japan and Communist China. And I do not think it unnatural to concern myself in this field. Since Japan and [Communist] China are closely connected with each other geographically, I think it dangerous that both people remain annoyed until 'human understanding' of the two countries is restored, whatever the present diplomatic relations, because an unnatural state will last indefinitely between the two." *Tokyo Shimbu*, Nov. 28, 1957, DS, Nov. 28-29, 1957.

²⁶ *Leftist Cultural Front*, op. cit., p. 423; this is Dr. Wilbur's conclusion also, op. cit., p. 221.

polls but is better liked and less disliked than Soviet Russia. Admiration for China seems to be growing. Polls confirm the widespread desire for trade with mainland China and also indicate a Japanese belief in the desirability of opening up diplomatic relations with their Asian neighbor.²⁷

Soviet Propaganda

In contrast with mainland China, Russia now has diplomatic contact with Japan. Perhaps this fact, with attendant issues described above, presents Japanese with the negative effect of Soviet deed propaganda, as against the honeyed words of cultural exchange. Behind that, of course, is a deep historical distrust of Russia. Out of this latent fear, strangely enough, comes one advantage to Russian propaganda of bluff and threat. As Arita Hachiro, former Foreign Minister of four pre-surrender cabinets, put it, "... I have been doubtful whether it is advisable for our country closely to cooperate with Free Nations alone."²⁸

Shortly after the war, the Russians revived their All-Soviet Foreign Culture Liaison Society (VOKS). That the U.S.S.R. had begun to place great stress on cultural exchange was first demonstrated by the fact that Russia sent the largest delegation, an eight-man team, to the meeting of Asian area representatives of national UNESCO committees, in Tokyo, February, 1956. Included in this team were one Deputy Minister and several area-language research specialists.²⁹

Since April, 1952, import restrictions on Soviet books have been lifted and the International Book Company has established an import agreement with Tomoe Trading Company, through a Soviet commercial representative in Japan. Prominent is the pic-

torial *Soviet Union*, with distribution outlets through *Akahata* and a half million circulation. Beyond these media, Russia has stressed somewhat less than has China, cultural interchange; outstanding exceptions were Soviet sports teams; the Russian violinist, David Oistrakh, who received a tremendous reception in Japan; and Dr. A. L. Oparin, the Russian biochemist. Behind the scenes in Japan are the familiar friendship organizations, like the Japan-Soviet Amity Society (Tozawa Tetsuhiko, Chairman); the People's Council for Restoration of Relations with Red China and Russia (Kuhara Fusanosuke, Chairman), the Japan-Soviet News Agency, the Russian Language Friends Society, Soviet Researchers Society, and many others.

The Russian mission, which can be filtered out of Soviet propaganda and through these various domestic media, is relatively simple and even brutal. It is to convince the Japanese that World War III, instigated by Western capitalist powers, is inevitable. Japan will or will not become involved, depending upon her entanglements with Western powers. Japan should therefore depend upon her own policy, her own defense. Weirdly, on this last point the extreme Left and extreme Right in Japan agree.³⁰ Finally, in this very line appears another difference between the Russian and the Chinese approaches to Japan. Whereas Moscow's interest is mainly in the realm of strategic intelligence and operational propaganda, Peking comes often admitting she is still backward and making serious efforts to learn about Japanese civilization and the digestive power demonstrated by Japan toward Western technology.

Americans can take credit for one defensive bulwark, constructed during our Occupation and capable of withstanding the assaults of Communist propaganda. Sometimes despite our military policies, we helped lay down the foundations for a large, vigorous, independent and well-informed Japanese press. Although it may sometimes infuriate us in this era of *sputnik* diplomacy, in other ways it has demonstrated even less hysteria than did the American media and public after *Sputnik II* and prior to the launching of the American explorer.

²⁷ Wilbur, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

²⁸ Panel, "The Future of Japanese Diplomacy (Part 3)," *Tokyo Shimbun*, Jan. 4, 1958, in *DS*, Jan. 7, 1958.

²⁹ *Leftist Cultural Front*, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-404.

³⁰ *Akahata*, Dec. 23, 1957, for example, sets the theme: "The U.S.'s scheme to introduce nuclear weapons into the countries bordering on the Soviet Union, China, and other Socialist nations and make preparations for an atomic war at the sacrifice of those nations at last began to take definite shape at the [Joint U.S.-Japan] Security Committee meeting. The U.S.-Japan joint announcement that the U.S. Government has decided to supply Japan with guided missiles 'in compliance with the Japanese Government's request' has again clearly established before the people the fact that the Security Committee is in truth, a tool designed to drag the Japanese people into a devastating nuclear war." *DS*, Dec. 25-26, 1957.

A brief profile of both Red China and Russia, as seen through samples drawn from the Japanese press, will perhaps serve as a fitting conclusion to this discussion of Japanese relations with the Communist world.

Whether we like it or not, many Japanese compliment Communist China for avoiding from the beginning extremes of Stalinism. Furthermore, most Japanese do not conclude that Red China is a mere satellite of the Soviet Union. Japanese are impressed by evidence that Peking is gaining increasing prestige in the Communist bloc. Japanese take secret pride in this stature of an Asian Power.³¹

Turning toward Russia, the two *sputniks* were publicly regarded in Japan as one of the greatest innovations in all human history, make no mistake of that. Nor did it make sense to Japanese to say that the Soviet Union had excelled *only* in *sputnik*, for Soviet technology had obviously and dramatically developed in the form of a huge pyramid. Of some 800 Tokyo residents questioned about the satellites, a large number admitted they were surprised at the remarkable progress of Soviet science. (The second most frequent reaction was the hope that earth satellites would be devoted to peaceful purposes.) Soviet deed propaganda merged with the effectiveness of myth when some Japanese assumed that even the Soviet denial of the launching of a manned rocket nevertheless demonstrated the technical superiority of the Soviet Union over the United States!³²

On the other hand, in their detached independence, Japanese publicists also recognized from the beginning that the significance of the Russian *sputnik* lay in its psychological value. It illuminated the technological

genius of Russians, not necessarily the superiority of a Socialist over a Capitalist system. In fact, common sense and the Japanese press told the public that Russia's superiority would not last very long. In the meanwhile, Japanese should not be misled by Socialists and even some Liberal-Democrats, who played into Russian hands by arguing that it was no use for Japan to build up self-defense. Some Japanese believed that, with increased Soviet self-confidence, tension and the possibility of war might even decrease. The majority opinion was, however, that the U.S.S.R. had intensified, through her psychological offensive, the East-West conflict. And one newspaper summed up the situation this way:

In the eyes of Japan, which has renounced arms, both the pompous Russians and the flurried Americans have gone off the rails. . . . We no longer can be in a mood to envy the haves.³³

Japan's relations with the Communist world—the frustrations of diplomatic contact, the successful themes of cultural interchange, and the profiles of Russia and Communist China in Japanese eyes—all provide at least one important lesson for Americans concerned with Japan. If Japan is to be defended by action on our part, there is little doubt that we must move beyond the essentially negative, military policy of containment, and beyond even the studied skills of technical and formal diplomacy. We need to send to Japan diplomats who at least give the impression that they know and like the Japanese. We need to give greater and greater emphasis to foreign economic aid, so that Japan can survive; and we need to expand our informational and cultural programs. Besides the Girards, who perhaps have been tragically necessary in Japan, we need to send more Marian Andersons and more Selman Waksman.

We may be running scared, as well we must, in the missile race. In the light of continuous and equally dangerous Chinese and Russian efforts in psychological pressure, informational persuasion and cultural interchange, however, we have so far scarcely chosen to run.

³¹ For representative views, see: Yamada Taro, "What is Going on Inside the Communist Bloc?" *Sekai Shuho*, Dec. 21, 1957; Komuro Makoto, "Actual State of USSR-Communist China Relations," *Soreen Kenkyu*, Nov., 1957; in *JM*, Dec. 16, 30, 1957; *Sankei Jiji*, Dec. 30, 1957, *DS*, Dec. 28-30, 1957.

³² See Hayashi Kentaro, "Epoch-making Significance of the Sputnik," *Bungei Shunju*, Special Issue, Nov. 1957; Komine Kiichi, "Soviet Technique; Japanese Technique," *Ibid.*, Jan. 1958, in *JM*, Dec. 9, 30, 1957; the Tokyo Citizen Reaction Survey was conducted by *Tokyo Shimbun*, Nov. 29, 1957; see also *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1958, in *DS*, Nov. 28-29, 1957, Jan. 9, 1958.

³³ *Tokyo Shimbun*, Jan. 8, 1958; also *Sankei Jiji*, Dec. 24, 1957; *Shin Yukan*, Dec. 12, 1957; *Yomiuri*, Dec. 18, 1957; in *DS*, Dec. 13, 19, 24, 1957, Jan. 8, 1958; also panel, "World Economy Under the Sputnik," *Sekai*, Jan. 1958; and Hasegawa Saiji, "U.S.-USSR Antagonism Becomes Aggravated under the Sputnik," *Jitsugyo no Nihon*, Dec. 1, 1957, in *JM*, Dec. 9, 23, 1957.

The nations of Southeast Asia "fear that the influx of Japanese capital, goods and services may open their countries to Japanese economic penetration." On the other hand, according to this writer, Japan "has long looked hopefully toward Southeast Asia" as an outlet for its manufactured goods.

Japan in Southeast Asia

BY AMRY VANDENBOSCH

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RELATIONS between Japan and Southeast Asia have never had an opportunity for normal development. Probably at long last the opportunity has now come. In the pre-exclusion days Japan was not ready for extensive intercourse with other countries and when it actively reentered international life only a century ago practically the whole of Southeast Asia had been reduced to colonial status by Western powers. With the establishment of the political independence of the countries of the region since World War II the Japanese are free to develop relations with them on a footing of equality with Westerners, once they have overcome the hostility aroused by Japanese cruelties during the occupation.

Unfortunately, Southeast Asia is threatened by a new imperialism that would exclude Japan from the region more effectively than the old Western colonialism. Chinese Communism has already swept part of Indochina into its orbit and there is real danger that other parts of the region may fall under its dominance.

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The Japanese came to the East Indies at about the same time (1600) as the Dutch. The East India Company employed them as soldiers. This colony of Japanese would in all probability have become important if Japan had not cut itself off from the world in 1638. Japanese were prohibited from leaving Japan and those abroad were not permitted to return home. The Japanese in Batavia became absorbed in the local population.

Japanese society was still feudal when Japan again opened its doors and though a program of industrialization was quickly adopted and vigorously pushed, it was several decades before the Japanese were in a position to develop interests abroad. It is, nevertheless, surprising that Japanese interests in Southeast Asia were so small in 1941. Only in the Philippines was there a Japanese population of any size. On the island of Mindanao some 20,000 Japanese had settled and developed a flourishing hemp industry. Japanese investments in the region as a whole were small.

There are factors which help to explain why the Japanese penetration of the region was not greater. The rapid shift from a feudal to an industrialized economy kept the Japanese busily engaged at home for a considerable time and Japanese capital and energy found room for operation in new territory acquired or controlled by Japan: Formosa in 1895, Korea and South Manchuria in 1905 and the whole of Manchuria 25 years later.

The chief interest of Japan in the region was in trade but here it ran into barriers. American goods enjoyed a 100 per cent preference in the Philippines; as a result the United States supplied the islands with nearly three-quarters of their imports. The

trade relationship between France and Indochina was similar, with very much the same results. British goods benefited from a modest preference in Burma and Malaya.

The Dutch followed the open door policy in the Indies until the world depression when the Dutch felt compelled to give some advantages to their own trade. Because of its large population (nearly half the total population of Southeast Asia) and because of the Dutch policy of giving no tariff preferences to their own goods, the Netherlands Indies offered the Japanese considerable opportunity for trade expansion. The Dutch had long feared Japanese commercial invasion of the Indies but it did not become an actual threat until the depression. The Japanese share of the Indies' imports was only about one per cent before 1913 and had increased to a little over ten per cent by 1929. During the next few years the Japanese share rose rapidly, reaching a peak of 32 per cent, in 1933. By the imposition of quotas and the resort to import licenses the Dutch succeeded in restricting Japanese imports. In 1937, the Japanese percentage of Indies' imports had fallen back to 25. In their drive to expand their trade with the Philippines, the Japanese encountered similar measures.

One of the difficulties in the trade relations between Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia was lack of balance. When Japanese goods constituted nearly one third of the total imports of the Indies, Japan's purchases constituted only about five per cent of the exports of the Dutch dependency. This is a problem today.

The Japanese commercial invasion alarmed the Dutch since the Japanese at the time also tried to capture the shipping and distribution business.

The Dutch feared that the Japanese had set covetous eyes on West New Guinea, the territory which is now a bone of contention between Indonesia and the Netherlands. This Dutch territory, which has an area equal to that of the present Japanese territory, was sparsely inhabited and largely unexplored. Dutch administrative control covered only the coastal fringes. A Japanese corporation had a concession in the territory of about 5500 hectares which it had

taken over from a German company. Here the Japanese were experimenting with growing cotton. A request for permission to import a thousand Japanese families was denied by the Indies government.

There were groups in Japan, among whom naval officers were fairly conspicuous, who advocated a "southward policy." Their objectives were rather vague. To some it meant merely seeking more liberal trade opportunities, to others it involved asserting the right to what others appeared to be neglecting and to still others it suggested actual acquisition of territory. Advocates of the policy declared that Manchukuo was a disappointment as a source of raw materials or as a market for Japanese goods; that Japan's attention was too much centered on the Asiatic continent; that there was danger in relying too heavily on the continent because Japan might some day be cut off from it by military action; that expansion southward overseas would bring far greater returns at less cost; and that, in any case, expansion on the continent should be balanced by overseas expansion.

How influential the movement really was is difficult to assess. However, when the office of governor general of Formosa fell vacant in 1936, Admiral Nagano, Minister of the Navy, suggested to the premier that since Formosa was a key position in the execution of the "southward policy" and in safeguarding Japan's southern line of defense, the practice of having a civilian as governor general should be discontinued and a naval officer should be appointed to the post. The proposal aroused a sharp controversy. As a compromise a retired admiral was appointed. There were rumors that the Japanese Anti-Communist Pact of 1936 contained a secret clause for the division of the Netherlands East Indies into spheres of influence.

The first move into the region of Southeast Asia came in 1939 when Japan occupied Hainan and claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands which are not much more than mud flats and are situated about midway between Indochina and the Philippines.

The Netherlands was not the only country which was apprehensive about Japanese intentions in the region. After the Russo-

Japanese War, the United States became concerned about Japanese designs on the Philippine Islands. President Theodore Roosevelt, who had been so eager for the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898, had come to feel that the islands were the "Achilles heel" of the United States, that they could not be defended against Japan. The Taft-Katsura memorandum of 1905 represents an attempt to deal with this problem. In this informal agreement President Roosevelt, through Secretary of War William H. Taft, gave Japan a free hand in Korea, and Count Katsura, the Prime Minister of Japan, disavowed "any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines." The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 had much the same meaning, adding Manchuria to Korea as a region in which the United States recognized Japan's special interests. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 had similar implications.

For its limited services to the Allies in World War I Japan was rewarded with the administration of the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator as a mandate under the League of Nations. Japan now sat astride the direct route between the Philippines and the United States.

There had been some division of opinion in Japanese imperialist circles whether to push westward on the mainland or to press southward overseas. Army circles had favored extension of Japanese control on the continent while naval circles supposedly had favored expansion southward. However, when the army was unable to bring the "China incident" to a satisfactory conclusion it demanded the occupation of Indochina as a means of cutting off foreign aid to China and for use as a base for further operations in Southeast Asia. The navy was now reluctant to go along, out of a healthy respect for the American and British navies.

Japan strongly objected to the traffic between Indochina and China, and even before its surrender to Germany the French government had restricted shipments. When Japan bombed the railway (in China) from the air Governor General Catroux agreed to suspend the movement of all war materials to China. But Japan wanted still more. As soon as France asked Germany for an armistice, the Japanese government demanded the

right to keep military observers in Indochina. The Pétain government yielded to this demand on June 20, 1940. At about the same time Japan asked the government of the Netherlands Indies to guarantee the continued supply of essential materials, especially oil, and threatened Great Britain with war unless it closed the frontier between Hong Kong and the Burma-China road.

With the reduction of France to helplessness by the German invasion, events had taken a favorable turn for Japanese plans. Indochina was admirably suited for use as a fulcrum for operations against China and the Western powers with interests in Southeast Asia, and as a gateway to the region. Besides its strategic location, Indochina had a superb naval base at Camranh Bay. It could also supply Japan with rice and other raw materials. Japan became bold and asked for a free hand in Indochina. On September 23, 1940, Japan occupied Tonkin and in July of the following year occupied all of Indochina, having obtained permission to use Saigon and Camranh Bay as naval bases and to take over eight air fields.

Meanwhile, Japan was busily strengthening its position with Indochina's neighbor, Thailand. The latter demanded the cession of territories in Indochina which once had been a part of its domain and threatened to occupy the areas if the French authorities refused to yield peacefully. Japan assumed the role of "mediator" between the two countries. Vichy yielded to Japanese pressure on March 11, 1941. At this time France also promised that Indochina would not enter into any agreement with any other country providing for political, economic or military cooperation against Japan.

Thailand, the only independent country in Southeast Asia before World War II, had already given evidences of pro-Japanese tendencies. In 1933, Siam, its official name then, had abstained from voting in the League of Nations when Japan's aggression in Manchuria was condemned. Whether there were any understandings or not, Thailand put up only a token resistance against the Japanese forces when they entered the country after Pearl Harbor, and thus facilitated the attack on Malaya by land. Marshal Phibun, the Prime Minister dictator of Thailand,

quickly entered into an alliance with Japan and declared war on Great Britain and the United States. With Japanese approval, Thailand annexed four Malay States and two Shan States of Burma.

It was natural that Japan would have its eye on the Netherlands Indies once there was a likelihood that Holland might become involved in the war in Europe. Japan was desperately in need of oil, rubber, tin, bauxite and other commodities produced by the Indies. When Germany invaded Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940, Foreign Minister Arita declared in a formal statement that "The Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development . . . that may affect the *status quo* of the Netherlands East Indies." What the purpose of this statement was is not clear, but the Japanese press interpreted it as an assertion of Japanese supremacy there.

Tokyo had earlier made some moves which give some indication of its intentions. On January 12, it had given notice to the Dutch government of its intention to terminate its treaty with the Netherlands whereby the signatories were pledged to settle all disputes that might rise between them by peaceful means, and a month later it demanded a lowering of trade restrictions in the Indies, greater facilities for Japanese enterprises, a freer entrance for Japanese nationals and mutual control of the press. In short, the Indies was to join the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

When the Netherlands fell to Germany in May, 1940, Japanese demands became more sweeping and urgent. Tokyo sent a mission to Java demanding extensive oil concessions and larger shipments of petroleum (especially aviation gasoline), rubber, tin and bauxite. The Dutch were in a difficult position. The Netherlands was under hostile occupation, Great Britain was in no position to give the Dutch much support in the Far East and the United States, while following a policy of making Japan's position with respect to strategic materials more desperate, refused to make any commitment of military aid in case of Japanese attack on the Indies. The Dutch dragged their feet, yielding somewhat but not nearly so much as the Japanese demanded. When President

Roosevelt at the end of July, 1941, issued an order freezing Japanese funds in the United States, the Netherlands Indies government proceeded drastically to restrict all exports to Japan.

The stage had been set for war. Japan's rulers had decided to march southward.

Japan's occupation policy varied somewhat from country to country, but the basic purpose was everywhere the same. Independence movements were encouraged and yet kept under control, or used for Japanese ends. Indochina was left under French administration until shortly before the end of the war, but elsewhere Japan set up puppet regimes, as in Burma and the Philippines, or resorted to the extensive use of natives in administrative positions. Apparently, the Japanese war lords intended to retain Malaya and develop Singapore as a strong base.

When the Japanese leaders began to realize that they could not win the war they encouraged independence movements in order to create situations which would make the recovery of their dependencies by the Western powers difficult, if not impossible. Thus Sukarno and Hatta were invited just a few days before the Japanese capitulation to set up a government for Indonesia.

The Japanese did not succeed in integrating the economy of the region into Greater East Asia, nor even in obtaining many supplies from it.

The political effects of the Japanese occupation were nevertheless tremendous. They could never be undone. Western prestige had been severely damaged and Japanese propaganda succeeded in instilling or sharpening anti-Western sentiments. Many natives were given greater administrative responsibility, however strict the supervision, than they had ever enjoyed before. Their self-confidence had been increased.

Japan was singularly unsuccessful in this grand colonial enterprise but the Japanese occupation made the restoration of the former Western colonial rule impossible.

Japan did not recover its independence until April 28, 1952, when the Japanese Peace Treaty went into effect. The newly independent countries of Southeast Asia were not pleased with the treaty provisions with respect to reparations. Indonesia and

the Republic of the Philippines reluctantly signed the treaty at San Francisco but later both refused to ratify it until Japan had entered into a reparations agreement with them. The treaty recognized Japan's obligation to pay reparations but it also recognized that the "resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations."

Japan agreed "promptly" to enter into negotiations with "Allied powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan," with reparations limited to services, technical assistance and processing raw materials.

Japan was eager to settle the reparations problem in order that normal relations might be established with the countries of Southeast Asia as quickly as possible. Agreement on general principles was quickly reached but a deadlock developed on the amount and method of payment. Indonesia and the Philippines demanded fantastic sums; the former at first asked for over \$17 billion and the latter \$8 billion. Japan agreed to begin at once on salvage work in Indonesia and Philippine waters as interim reparations to be incorporated in a later settlement.

Japan succeeded in reaching an agreement with Burma in 1954. The former agreed to pay \$200 million in goods and technical services and to invest \$50 million in joint enterprises in Burma over a 10-year period. After many vicissitudes, negotiations with the Philippines were successfully concluded. At one point in the negotiations, Vice-President, now President, Garcia, signed a memorandum providing for the payment of the amount offered by Japan, but President Magsaysay repudiated the agreement. According to the provisions of the agreement, which was signed May 9, 1956, Japan will pay \$500 million in capital goods, \$20 million in cash, \$30 million in services over a period not to exceed ten years, and \$250 million in long-term development loans.

A settlement was finally also reached with Indonesia. A difficulty here was a \$177 million postwar trade debt which Indonesia owed Japan and which it insisted be cancelled as part of the reparations agreement. The settlement was probably hastened by

the desire of the Indonesians to obtain Japanese ships to carry their inter-island traffic. When Indonesians took over the Dutch-owned inter-island shipping company in December, 1957, in their campaign against Dutch economic interests in the country, the service collapsed, with serious economic consequences. Japan now had the advantage. In any case, Jakarta announced on January 20, 1958, that a reparations agreement had been reached with Japan. Japan waived claim to the postwar trade debt, but otherwise the agreement was very similar to the settlement with the Philippines. It involved the equivalent of about \$800 million.

The Filipinos and Indonesians badly wanted the reparations, yet they are also apprehensive about them. They fear that the influx of Japanese capital, goods and services may open their countries to Japanese economic penetration.

Japan is desperately in need of an outlet for its manufactured goods and it has long looked hopefully toward Southeast Asia. Before the war it obtained half of its iron ore requirements from Malaya and the Philippines. It sold substantial amounts of goods in the region. Since the war, trade with the region has been hampered by the unsettled economic and political conditions prevailing there and the wrangle over reparations.

At least one of the road blocs has now been removed. In 1955, Indonesia was Japan's sixth best customer and Singapore, which is an important distribution center for the region, its seventh best customer; the former taking \$67,337,000 and the latter \$62,773,000 worth of Japanese goods. These figures may now be considerably increased. Premier Kishi in his visit to the United States in 1957 tried to win American support for his "Asian Plan."

Premier Kishi suggests that Japan and the United States enter into a partnership in helping the region—the former supplying the technical assistance and the latter the capital. The Premier has not yet obtained American financial support for his plan but the Japanese government in January announced that it would extend \$15 million in long-term, non-interest loans to the countries of Southeast Asia for aid to medium and small enterprises. Southeast Asia must have capital and technology if it is to develop.

A specialist analyzes the leading political figures of Japan's major political parties, evaluating their contributions to Japan today and tomorrow.

Japan's Leaders, 1958

BY KENNETH COLTON

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THE Liberal Democratic Party leadership still reflects in 1958 the scars of the struggle which finally led in November, 1955, to a union of the whole conservative political movement. Because it was a shotgun marriage, following by one month a similar merger of the Socialists, a careful balance of factional representation in positions of formal leadership was necessary, and the need still continues. The "main stream" of the party is led by the Prime Minister and party president, Nobusuke Kishi, and his chief ally, Ichiro Kono, Director of the Economic Planning Board in the cabinet. Between them, they control a firm majority of the key posts in party and government.

Next to the party's president, leadership centers in a 40-man Executive Committee and six party officials who head as many major party offices. In addition, there is a large body of "elder statesmen," 21 of whom are called Advisors, and another group of 28 in a slightly lower, but similar category called "Councillors." The latter two agencies have no formal power; most of their

members are practically retired "leaders" who owe their present posts to an almost accidental, and usually brief, moment of glory as a cabinet minister.

Theoretically the Liberal Democrats focus formal power in their president. It seldom works that way even in normal times, and because of the bitter factionalism which preceded and followed the 1955 merger, a form of collective factional leadership prevails today. In practice, this operates through the six top officials who function as an inner party executive: the Secretary General, and the chairmen of the Executive Committee, Political Affairs Research Committee, Diet Strategy Committee, National Organization Committee, and less so, the Discipline Committee.

Officially, the Executive Committee is the major organ for important policy decisions. But because of the need to harmonize factions by a balanced distribution in the six party offices, under Kishi the Executive Committee has markedly declined in importance. Almost all major party decisions today are first settled by the six top officials before being taken to the Executive Committee.

Since the shake-down period of party union in 1955-1956, there has recently been a noticeable decline in party strife among rival factions and rival leaders. The decline has been due in part to the pressures to maintain a solid front to preserve power against the united and growing Socialist Party. It has been helped by the practical retirement of such former leaders as ex-premiers Shigeru Yoshida, Ichiro Hatoyama and Tanzan Ishibashi and the death of still others, Taketora Ogata and Mamoru Shigemitsu among them. Another major reason is that the cause of many of the former factions has disappeared with the merger. Moreover, in an enlarged united party, the smaller cliques can no longer have much

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influence. Consequently, numbers of these factions are breaking up, such as those formerly led by Tokutaro Kitamura, Mitsujiro Ishii, and even that led by the veteran party warhorse, Bamboku Ono. Members are attaching themselves to other more powerful leaders, or watchfully waiting. New alignments and new bases for alignments too, appear to be in the process of formation, though they can not jell until at least the general elections of 1958 test these bases, hopes and claims of strength.

Nobusuke Kishi

Leader of the party today is Nobusuke Kishi, who succeeded to the offices of premier and president in February and March, 1957, respectively, on the retirement from both offices of Tanzan Ishibashi because of illness. A slender man of medium height, a longish oval face, a pendulous mouth and a deceptively receding chin, Kishi at 61 is still relatively young as Japanese politicians go. His rise to top political power has been rapid. Yet it tells much of the man that his climb was predicted even before he formally joined a political party for the first time in April, 1953. The explanation of expectation, realization and his position today lies in both Kishi's career and his character.

Born in Yamaguchi Prefecture in southern Japan, the home of the old Choshu clan that dominated much of Japanese government and conservative politics before the war, Kishi attended the traditional training grounds of Japan's bright young men, the First Higher School, located in Tokyo, and the former Tokyo Imperial University, before entering government service in 1920. His 24 year career as a bureaucrat was spent mostly in the Commerce and Industry Ministry, where he soon came to be recognized as a leader of the "reform bureaucrats." While still under 40, he spent three years on the mainland as the uncrowned head of Manchurian commerce and industry. Later, after a controversial period as vice minister in the Commerce and Industry Ministry in Tokyo, he entered Tojo's cabinet in October, 1941. He remained there, after a brief non-party career in the Diet in 1942-1943, to take charge eventually of wartime munitions pro-

duction. He ended his prewar government career in 1944, when his opposition to Tojo after the fall of Saipan helped to topple the latter from office.

It has been suggested that Kishi's base in the old Choshu clan, his education in the traditional schools, and his career in government before turning to politics represent a return to the prewar traditions of political leadership. Then numbers of men with distinguished careers in the bureaucracy entered politics to assume an eventual high post in party affairs. The parallel is more superficial than real, for the elemental fact of Japanese politics today is the greatly increased power position of the party which makes necessary an extensive experience in both the party and the Diet before one can aspire to top posts in government or party.

Kishi's rise does not establish a future pattern. The odds, in fact, appear to be against topflight political careers for ex-bureaucrats in the future because the talents required for government administration and party management vastly differ and the length of time required to establish a solid party base is now estimated generally at 10 years. The difficulties facing an early duplication of Kishi's record is seen in the careers of the more than 20 ex-bureaucrats whom Yoshida brought into the party nearly 10 years ago. Only two or three can be reckoned as significant party leaders today.

Kishi's quick ascent to major office, after just four years of actual party experience, and only two in a major party office, is largely explained by the accident of factionalism and the character of his earlier career. As one of the politically minded "reform bureaucrats," a director of Manchurian industry under a puppet figurehead, and a member of a wartime cabinet, Kishi was not without prior political and administrative experience before entering post-peace treaty politics. Moreover, as head of a party still in process of transition after a merger, he reflects much of that transition, as well as experience with his nation's problems.

Of the three rival candidates to succeed Ichiro Hatoyama in December, 1956, Kishi was the only one who had served in a leading government post before the war, the only one to have sat in a pre-1946 Diet, and

the only one without actual experience in occupation politics. None of the three had had a prewar party career. The winner had never served in the bureaucracy, but had had the longest postwar political record. As a political leader in a transitional phase of shifting factions, Kishi thus represents a change too in political generations, the transition from the occupation era leadership of Yoshida and the prewar party veteran reign of Hatoyama to an eventual postwar generation of party-bred leaders. Kishi falls in between the first two and the last groups. His rise to power may indeed have been helped because of it, for he was free from many otherwise "entangling alliances."

Kishi is also one of the more than 70 ex-bureaucrats who make up almost one-fourth of the party's strength in the House of Representatives. Though he shares their base in a government career, Kishi is hardly representative of all. His background was exclusively prewar, others had postwar careers; he served in the central government, others served in local posts; Kishi came from the "reform bureaucracy," others from the "old line" ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Foreign Office. Kishi's most open and stubborn opposition today comes from high level postwar ex-bureaucrats.

Kishi's background has appeal also because of the national as well as party concern over economic diplomacy, trade agreements, balances of international payments. His wartime experience in the munitions industry finds him in power at a time when Japan is herself seeking to revive her own industry. In a party in which many are concerned with a revival of healthy patriotism, his prewar career brings him added support. With a highly intelligent, flexible mind, basically a thorough conservative, and in many ways very traditional, Kishi is a realist in recognizing the possible. His friends claim he is more than bureaucrat-turned-politician, that his present forceful support of democracy is rooted in firm conviction.

Ichiro Kono

Kishi's present position of political leadership owes much to the potent backing of Ichiro Kono, currently Director of Economic

Planning Board in the cabinet. This is one of the stranger political alliances in the postwar era, for Kishi was a leader of the new bureaucracy, with little party background, while Kono comes from a long political tradition of opposition to the bureaucrats, and not least the new bureaucracy with which Kishi was associated.

The alliance originated in the factional strife which preceded the merger of 1955, their common opposition to Yoshida and their joint need for Hatoyama as a symbol to drive Yoshida from power. Kono remained in the third Hatoyama cabinet after the merger as the acknowledged spokesman for and the real power behind the premier. Kishi's official duty as Secretary General was to sustain Hatoyama's leadership, a most congenial duty since the major internal opposition came from Yoshida's ex-Liberals. The connection thus early formed has been sustained because Kishi and Kono still need each other. Few expect the alliance to be permanent; its end is expected when one or the other considers himself strong enough to stand alone. When the break comes, it will probably touch off another series of violent factional struggles.

Just two years younger than Kishi at 59, a graduate of Waseda University where he was a cross country runner, Kono began his Diet career in 1932 as a *Seiyukai* partisan. Prior to that he had been briefly a private secretary to the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and earlier a reporter of the *Asahi Shimbun* attached to the same ministry. Kono's present power in the party and government rests upon the depth of his political experience, his varied business connections, and his influence in the bureaucracy, particularly in the Ministry of Agriculture. Steeped in party experience, a veteran of most party offices, his skills in political and Diet manoeuvre are unquestioned. His business interests range from race horses to natural gas, but center in industries which have close connections with the work of the Ministry of Agriculture, such as fertilizers, and especially fisheries. His business acumen, and not least his somewhat darkened reputation for an affinity for political funds, are widely recognized.

Kono is notable for his aggressive energy

and determination, his readiness for quick decisions and a willingness to accept responsibility. Direct in thought, frank and even blunt in speech, he combines a politician's sense of intuition with a keen, hardheaded realism. Together these traits would make him a power in the party whether in or out of office. Shigeru Yoshida was not without reason in fearing Kono, next to the late Bukichi Miki, of all his opponents.

Kono's political intuition, realism and readiness to assume responsibilities were shown in his support of the agreement to terminate the war between Japan and the U.S.S.R. in 1956, although he himself is staunchly anti-Communist. These traits are also illustrated in his choice of the Directorship of the Economic Planning Board in 1957 at a time when economic diplomacy, unsettled reparations, trade agreements, commercial use of nuclear energy and an unbalance in international payments were problems as well as opportunities. In that office, Kono assumes that the other economic ministries of government should coordinate their programs with the plans of the E.P.B. Even the usually proud Ministry of Finance is hardly a match for Kono at this time.

As an ally, Kono has disadvantages as well as advantages. His drive and patent ambitions inevitably have made him many party enemies. Opposition to Kishi in December, 1956, centered on Kono as much as on Kishi. Any major move by Kono towards immediate political power might even threaten a split in the party. Although undoubtedly one of the real political powers in his party, and with reputed designs on an eventual party presidency, Kono's realism is indicated by reports that he will first seek the post of Secretary General, from whence a determined man of his abilities might soon control the party.

Takeo Miki

Confronted with the need for a stronger personal base in the party and the factional divisions among Liberal Democrats, Kishi's tactic has been to "divide and rule," to split his opposition by offering allures of seeming importance which in reality bind the recipient to accept a responsibility to preserve

the *status quo* of Kishi leadership. Opposition, however, remains. Among those who have resisted encirclement is Takeo Miki, currently Chairman of the Political Affairs Research Committee of the party, and thus one of the six top party officers. Although a party bred man like Kono, Miki gained his major experience in the hectic school of postwar and occupation era politics. His social, economic and political thought is cast in a more liberal mold. Both share a shrewd sense of political intuition and skill in party and parliamentary manoeuvre.

A full decade younger than Kono at 48, the son of a wealthy Shikoku farmer, Miki entered the Diet as a political independent in 1937. His rise to political prominence since the war has been due to his appeal to a liberal youth, his talent for jockeying minority parties into a balance of power in a multiple party situation. His greater liberalism, his talents and reputation for manoeuvre and his comparative youth appear to be obstacles to getting the most cordial support from his logical allies, those under Kenzo Matsumura, dean of the ex-Minseito bloc, in the former Progressive Party. As Chairman of the Political Affairs Research Committee, Miki reflects a growing concern for policies and issues, another logical outgrowth of the 1955 merger. His political task is to maintain a holding operation for his reduced factional supporters until a new opportunity arises to build a new coalition similar to that which led him to temporary power under the shortlived Ishibashi cabinet.

Hayato Ikeda

The most openly declared opponent to Kishi is Hayato Ikeda, who inherited the leadership of the ex-Yoshida bureaucrats. Kishi's junior by three years, and a veteran of the old line bureaucracy, the Ministry of Finance, he became its vice minister after the war and the purge, before resigning and later recruitment as a Liberty Party candidate in 1949. An expert on taxation, he became Yoshida's Minister of Finance while a freshman Diet member, and held that portfolio during the austerity program enforced under the Dodge Plan until the Korean War

boom ended it. One of Yoshida's trusted administrators, he soon became one of Yoshida's most loyal political supporters, serving as Secretary General of that party in 1954 at the time Yoshida was forced from office.

Ikeda has many of the same characteristics as Yoshida, being blunt and stubborn, particularly when facing opposition. Like Yoshida too, Ikeda is weak in the political arts of party management and political relations. His undiplomatic bluntness in speech has been notorious and has made him a frequent target of non-confidence votes as a cabinet minister. Passage of one such vote in the fall of 1952 drove him from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the last cabinet post he held. He makes enemies with almost the same ease as does Kono. His assets are his hold in the Ministry of Finance, his connections with the banking and fiscal circles, his acquaintances and reputation abroad. His weaknesses include a still immature political development and the fact that his core of followers consists mainly of ex-bureaucrats who themselves wield little definitive party power and have little respect for increasing their numbers.

II

Leadership of the Japan Socialist Party today remains almost exactly what it was when the Leftwing and Rightwing Socialist Parties merged in October, 1955. Official leadership is focused in three major bodies: a group of seven officials who head the seven major party committees; a 40-man Central Executive Committee, the chief policy organ of the party next to the annual convention; and a 15-member group of "elder statesmen" called Advisors.

Like the Liberal Democrats, the composition of these bodies is dictated by the necessities of party factionalism. The present leadership, however, controls a majority of the top party posts and a similar margin in the Central Executive Committee. Three leaders of the six major party factions are among the Advisors, a reflection of factional problems at time of merger, but effective control of party affairs remains centered in

the seven leading officials. Because of factionalism, however, not all members of the leading party organs wield the influence their positions might imply.

As has been true since the establishment of the postwar party in 1945, top leaders, with a few exceptions among postwar recruits from the ex-bureaucratic circles, are all prewar political veterans. This is particularly evident in the composition of the seven leading officials and the group of Advisors, although less true of the Central Executive Committee which now reflects a party base in small business groups, and has a sparse representation of the legal and medical professions and journalism. The only member of the C.E.C. who is not a Diet member is an active representative of Japan's second largest labor federation, *Zenro*.

A striking fact is that despite the burgeoning of the postwar trade union movement, no former major leader of postwar labor is a member of the three top organs of the party. Not even *Sohyo*, with a membership of more than 3 million and the largest federation of trade unions in Japan, has yet provided the party with top leaders. Party observers explain the paradox by stating that almost all Socialists have the backing of one or more unions, regardless of their own membership. Moreover, they maintain that the postwar labor movement is still too young to have produced a Diet member with sufficient party experience to reach the higher levels of leadership, but that this is sure to come.

Mosaburo Suzuki

Head of the party as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee is Mosaburo Suzuki. A 65 year old veteran of the prewar proletarian movement, Suzuki typifies much within his party. One of the founders of the modern Socialist political movement 33 years ago, he was a consistent member of the prewar doctrinaire, theoretical Left. Like most of his present colleagues, Suzuki is without any direct union affiliation, and in fact has never belonged to one. His career reflects the struggle within the postwar party for a hegemony which the Left won in 1949, the struggle over whether the party should

insist upon the traditional Marxist concept of a working class, or whether it must be broadly representative of all classes supporting the Socialist cause.

A small stocky man, barely over five feet tall, with an unruly head of graying hair running back from his forehead as though combed with his fingers, and a bounding vigorous platform manner, Suzuki was born in a deeply impoverished family in 1893. He was drawn into the active proletarian movement by that background, his struggle to get an extension-level education at Waseda University, a brief experience as a journalist in Siberia in 1918 and a two-year stay in the United States between 1920 and 1922. While in the United States he read widely in Marxist literature in a reading circle which later became a part of the American wing of the Japan Communist Party. Suzuki never joined the party. While still in New York City, he got himself invited in 1922 to attend the Moscow Conference of the Toilers of the Far East as a journalist. After that conference and a brief but involuntary detention by suspicious Soviet leaders, he returned to Tokyo, where in the following year he joined in establishing a Socialist problems study society, which in turn helped to launch the first Socialist parties that bloomed after the adoption of the manhood suffrage law in 1925.

Although Suzuki entered active proletarian politics only in 1928, he ran for office for the first time in 1937, winning a seat in the Tokyo City Assembly as the head of a Leftist splinter Socialist party. The same year he was arrested on suspicion of participating in a Communist united front drive. Though not found guilty, he remained under protective parole until the end of the war in 1945.

Like most of his prewar colleagues, Suzuki joined the new Socialist Party founded in 1945, a party led by the Rightwing, although the rank and file were definitely Leftwing. His present rise to power rests upon this shift in the Socialist movement from the prewar moderate Right to the postwar Left. A vocal champion of the united front, he broke with that policy in May, 1947, and has been a consistent opponent of cooperation with the Communists since.

Today Suzuki is a different leader from that of even nine years ago, when he first became Chairman of the C.E.C. He has made a gradual but steady transition from a doctrinaire Left to a qualified centrist position, a move that has perceptibly continued since the merger of 1955. This shift also appears to have been made by the major segment of the party's former Left, a product of growing party responsibilities, lengthened Diet experience, and opportunities to observe and experience the gaps in former orthodox Marxist precepts. Much of the shift has been unconscious for the party, and produces the anomaly of former traditional Marxists, like Suzuki, uttering Marxist phrases and dogmas in party conferences but acting on non-Marxist principles in daily activities.

Suzuki's transition towards the center has been gradual. As late as 1951 his Marxist tenets caused him to abstain from voting on a Socialist International resolution which placed first emphasis upon the democratic base of a party, not on its class character. But in 1954, after the party split three years before, Suzuki successfully opposed efforts of the Leftist *Sohyo* to force a program on the Leftwing Socialists which would have indicated support of the U.S.S.R.

Suzuki's assets include his long record in the Socialist cause, his uncompromising position in the prewar years, his membership in the Left which became the party's majority in postwar years. His value to the party is as a symbol, and should the Socialists soon come to power he would be his party's choice as premier. A recent bout of illness and some discontent within the party over his lack of ability to develop effective programs to lead the party to power may, however, provoke efforts to replace him if power is long delayed.

His weaknesses include the difficulties of casting off the shackles produced by minority preoccupation with the purity of doctrine. Although an admitted expert in Marxism, he is criticized in the party for his tergiversations in policy decisions. Another difficulty shared by most within his party is his lack of experience in administrative responsibilities of government.

Jotaro Kawakami

Suzuki's chief support in his leadership comes from the moderate wing of the prewar Socialist movement, represented today in the person of Jotaro Kawakami. Kawakami represents what is essentially a band of professional prewar political veterans, plus a small addition of postwar moderates. He differs from Suzuki in his prewar career in having entered the Socialist movement not from a proletarian base, but from idealistic and Christian humanitarian convictions. Like others of that group, such as Mitsu Kono, Kawakami was once a college professor, at Kwansei Gakuin in Kobe, southern Japan.

Kawakami's value to Suzuki as a prop to the latter's moderate Leftist position rests upon his record as one of the first Socialists to enter a prewar Diet, winning his seat in 1928 as one of eight proletarian party members. He rose to a leading position in the moderate-Right Social Mass Party as chief lieutenant of its *de facto* leader. His record as a devoted party worker, his lack of personal ambition, his mild and sincere character made him acceptable then as in postwar years as a leader of a faction-ridden party when personal rivalries could not tolerate another. That record and character made him welcomed by the Rightwing Socialist Party as leader in 1952, following his release from the purge the year before. He worked for a Socialist reunification in 1955, when his Rightwing party was a definite minority, and refused to seek a position of power in the united body, although he was inevitably made one of the 15 party Advisors.

Now nearly 69, Kawakami represents the past in the Japanese Socialist movement, the lingering influence of the prewar Rightwing leadership in a day of Leftwing dominance. He represents too the changing of prewar factional alignments taking place among Socialists as among Liberal Democrats. Not all of Kawakami's prewar colleagues in the old *Nichiro* have followed his postwar lead. He belongs to that prewar Socialist leadership which gave active guidance and direction to farm and labor movements, even held major offices within both, but were not themselves of the farm or the workbench.

Today these former leaders have no per-

sonal ties with the postwar projections of these earlier groups. The base of the old *Nichiro*, therefore, has steadily narrowed, not least because the postwar shift of the party to the Left has posed problems of recruitment difficult to solve. Never a forceful assertive party leader, Kawakami is today more the symbol of the *Nichiro* legacy than its actual power. The latter, in so far as reduced factionalism allows, is wielded by the party's Secretary, Inejiro Asanuma, and Mitsu Kono, the latter especially skilled in policy formulation.

Like the leaders of other factions, Kawakami's role has been affected by the decline of active factionalism itself. The reasons are similar to those which produced the same trend in Liberal Democratic ranks. This is helping Suzuki maintain leadership because bloc emphasis is more on the party as a whole than on former factional advantage. Such a situation of reduced factionalism might favor a return to top leadership by one of Kawakami's background; however, his very moderation, humility and lack of assertive drive, plus his lack of roots in the Socialists' major postwar supporting organs, labor in particular, mitigate against such an eventuality.

Hiroo Wada

Another significant party leader who has worked to sustain Suzuki's leadership, although not without a latent rivalry, is Hiroo Wada. A rarity, a member of the postwar political generation who has achieved recognized status as a top party leader, Wada is one of the small group of ex-bureaucrats who entered the party between 1947 and 1950. Many look to Wada as an eventual successor to Suzuki. His credentials include his membership in the Leftwing since formally joining the party in 1949, his position as a major party policy draftsman, his long connection with the agrarian problem through his prewar career in the Ministry of Agriculture.

Moreover, along with Suzuki, Saburo Eda and others, he can point to prewar arrest and imprisonment; as a leading secretary in the Cabinet Planning Board he was charged in 1940 with fostering Communistic policies while an official of that Board. His

detention and subsequent parole ended only in the closing weeks of the war. Wada's party experience includes a tenure in the post of Secretary of the Leftwing Socialist Party and experience as chief of the party's Policy Investigation Committee. He was in this post in 1957 when his party's Discipline Committee removed him on charges of improper use of his connections with agricultural cooperatives to get party funds.

Like Ikeda in the Conservative party, Wada represents the ex-bureaucrats in his. The assets of the ex-bureaucrats in the Socialist party are today particularly great because of the traditional Socialist emphasis on doctrine and because the postwar expansion in Diet strength brought many into the party fold, particularly labor leaders. This leaves the Socialists short on members with talent in planning and organization, habits of study, accumulated information and experience in administration. The weakness of the ex-bureaucrats again is their lack of zeal in party activity and shortage of experience in the political arts. Some ex-bureaucrats, like Eki Sone of the Rightwing, an ex-career diplomat, and Leftwingers Seiichi Katsumata and Tadataka Sata, have applied themselves industriously to remedying their lack. But though Wada and his ex-bureaucratic colleagues have also been active in party affairs, he like them has been slow to acquire the political personality and sense of touch necessary for leadership in a large and polyglot party.

Some seasoned observers within the party believe that despite their present assets, there is little prospect for long-range leadership from the ex-bureaucrats, that their importance will decline as the party matures. Like the Conservatives, they point to the importance of political skills and the length of time required to acquire them. Moreover, ex-bureaucrats, although they have personal ties, as Wada has with *Sohyo*, are without organizational connections with major supporting groups of the party. Significantly, despite the increase in the party's Diet strength since 1949, there has been almost no increase in the number of leading ex-bureaucrats in the parliamentary wing of the party.

But at 55, a comparative youth among

the seasoned veterans of the party, Wada's youth and impressive intelligence gives him an appeal, especially to students and the intellectual following of the party, which others, including Suzuki and Kawakami, can not match. In that youth, which offers possibilities for further acquisition of political traits, lies Wada's prospects for winning his party's top office.

Suehiro Nishio

Perhaps the leading representative of labor in current top party levels today is the graying prewar veteran of the Rightwing, Suehiro Nishio, Secretary of the original postwar united party and former Chief Cabinet Secretary in the coalition government of 1947-1948. The anomaly of his position is that he represents the Rightwing of labor, principally in *Zenro*, whereas labor's political power lies with the vastly larger and more important *Sohyo*. Tough minded, a hardheaded realist, Nishio began his prewar career in the workshop, not the classroom. One of the avowed non-Marxists in the party, he dates his rejection of that creed from his observation of the labor movement in the U.S.S.R. in 1924, during the N.E.P. period. His non-Marxism, realism, stubborn and uncompromising opposition to communism, account for many of his past and present political difficulties in the postwar party.

Nishio's support comes from a core of prewar associates in the *Shamin* wing of the Socialist movement, plus a prewar and postwar mixture. The faction today is small and has only minor influence in the party, but Nishio considers its function is to remind and to prod the party to what he considers its inevitable course towards the middle and even the Right. He is the symbol in his party of the disagreement which still underlies party policy. His Marxist and quasi-Marxist colleagues see the world situation as a contest between socialism and capitalism; hence they are skeptical and sometimes hostile to many United States programs. Nishio sees the conflict as one between totalitarianism and democracy, and stands squarely with the latter, which he says makes him neither pro nor anti.

The opposite to Nishio among Socialist

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leaders is another party Advisor, Jiichiro Matsumoto. A 71 year old veteran of the prewar movement also, Matsumoto belongs to the form *eta* class at the lowest ladder in Japanese society. Matsumoto's thought and action are deeply colored by his emotional rejection of the stigma formerly attached to that class and his suspicions of its lingering prejudice. He has, in fact, made a political career out of posing as the champion of the *eta*, though legally the class no longer exists and nobody, including Matsumoto, actually knows how many members there are in Japan today. This husky burly figure famous for his spade beard, with a fetish of never wearing a tie, is proud of the fact that he seldom even reads. His strengths lie in his emotional, almost instinctive sympathy for the underdog, not at all in theory. Symbol of the far Left in the party, he is supported by the doctrinaire Marxists and fellow travellers who would welcome alliances and cooperation with the Communists. Though he himself is no advocate of a violent revolution as the road to power, some half of his dozen party followers would not hesitate to travel that road.

Summary

Matsumoto and Nishio symbolize the Right and the far Left within the party; Wada, Suzuki and Kawakami represent the gradations of the widened center, which with Wada and Suzuki still leans towards the Left. If the party is moving it appears likely to go slowly towards the center, yet the iron hand of Marxist dogma still governs the party when wrestling with principle or policy. It is not impossible that dogma and theory could pull it, at least temporarily, in an opposite direction.

Future leadership after the present veterans retire, in the judgment of one seasoned party member, is likely to come first from the prewar party-bred intellectual with a union, labor or farm background, second from a similar postwar group, third from the ex-bureaucrats, and finally from the maturing labor union. Significantly, the latter categories were placed last because of the importance, and the time necessary, to acquire the political skills and experience for party leadership.

Received At Our Desk

Japan

JAPAN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. A symposium published for the Council on Foreign Relations. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. 314 pages and index, \$4.75).

Six specialists working with the Council on Foreign Relations analyze various phases of our relations with Japan during and since our military occupation of that defeated nation. "Politics and the Future of Democracy in Japan" is discussed by Hugh Borton, former Director of Columbia's East Asian Institute and now President of Haverford College. Paul F. Langer, who writes in this issue of *CURRENT HISTORY*, evaluates "Communism in Independent Japan." "International Aspects of Japan's Economic Situation" are analyzed by Jerome B. Cohen, Professor of Economics at the College of the City of New York. Donald Keene of Columbia University discusses "Literary and Intellectual Currents in Postwar Japan and Their International Implications." C. Martin Wilbur, Director of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, deals with "Japan and the Rise of Communist China," and William J. Jorden, now chief of *The New York Times* bureau in Moscow, discusses "Japan's Diplomacy Between East and West." Tables and appendices add to the usefulness of this well-written symposium, which covers much the same ground dealt with in this issue of *CURRENT HISTORY*, but is more comprehensive, with much greater detail.

SHORIKI, MIRACLE MAN OF JAPAN. BY EDWARD UHLAN and DANA L. THOMAS. (New York: Exposition Press, 1957. 202 pages, \$3.50).

Owner of *Yomiuri Shimbun* and first Atomic Energy Commissioner of Japan, Matsutaro Shoriki is a remarkable man, and this story of his life is well worth

reading. Imprisoned for 21 months without trial by United States Army Occupation Forces as a "war crimes suspect," Shoriki subsequently sponsored the American "Atoms for Peace" project for the United States State Department. Active in the fields of radio and television as well as the press, this amazing man is a follower of Zen Buddhism, a contemplative religion. Here is a well-written account of a fascinating life.

JAPAN DICTIONARY. JAPANALIA. By LEWIS BUSH. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. 200 pages, appendices, bibliography and index. Illustrated, with photographs, a map and coloured frontispiece, \$10.)

A Britisher now with the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation, Lewis Bush spent more than 20 years compiling the material included in this small encyclopedia of "Things Japanese." Information about Japanese dogs, fish, eating habits, fairy tales, historical persons, ceremonies, hair styles and many other items has been collected, abbreviated and alphabetized for those interested in Japan.

History and Politics

LENINISM. By ALFRED G. MEYER. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957. 324 pages, notes and index, \$5.50.)

V. I. Lenin was a revolutionist, a man who gave practical shape to Marxist thought. Hence, it is important to see how theory was altered to conform to existing realities. Alfred G. Meyer brings the same care and learning to his study of Leninism that is to be found in his earlier book, *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice*. He interprets the nuances of Leninist thought in relation to the politics of the day, never letting

us forget the opportunism of this single individual, whose successors have been quick to follow in the steps of the master. "For the Leninist, the difficulty lies not in devising morally acceptable means, but only in finding ways by which the end can be attained in the fastest and surest manner."

Leninism was outside the tradition of other Russian Marxism: "As well as being more radical, Leninism is also more pessimistic; Lenin showed less faith in the intelligence and good will of anyone else than did other Marxists. Finally, Leninism is 'hard' Marxism." Lenin was a man of many faces, never afraid to be inconsistent, to take a position and flatly to deny it at a less favorable moment. "... There are in reality several Lenins. ... There are the Lenin who believed in democracy and the one who instituted centralism; the internationalist and the Soviet patriot; the political realist and the man who thundered against opportunism; the gradualist of the article *On Co-operation* and the advocate of permanent revolution or *pererastanie*."

NAKED TO MINE ENEMIES. By CHARLES W. FERGUSON. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958. 501 pages, notes and index, \$6.00.)

After six years of research and four years of editing, Charles Ferguson, senior editor of *The Reader's Digest*, has published a well-written account of a fascinating era. The story of the rise of Thomas Cardinal Wolsley, his relations with King Henry VIII of England and his downfall are recounted in colorful detail.

THE FRENCH NATION. FROM NAPOLEON TO PETAIN. 1814-1940. By D. W. BROGAN. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. 303 pages and index, \$4.50.)

In his customary readable style, Mr. Brogan reviews French history looking at least in part for explanations of France's chronic instability. Military, political and economic history, French art and liter-

ature, all are woven into this panorama of the French nation since 1814.

Naval History

GHOST SHIP OF THE CONFEDERACY.

By EDWARD BOYKIN. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1957. 404 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.95.)

Of the many sea raiders in the history of naval warfare, none was more famous or accomplished than the Confederate ship *Alabama*. Her captain, Raphael Semmes, learned his trade with the commerce raider, *Sumter*. When he was put in command of the English-built *Alabama*, he marked up a career of destruction of Yankee shipping that has never been equalled. Singlehanded, he almost drove the Union flag from the seas. In the end, when his ship went down in the English Channel under the guns of the *Kearsage*, the Confederacy's star was also setting. Semmes lived to become a respected lawyer in Mobile, but his name and that of the *Alabama* are linked in naval history.

BROADSIDES AND BOARDERS. By MARVIN H. ALBERT. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. 384 pages, index and bibliography, \$5.00.)

Mr. Albert gives us a history of sailing ship warfare and the sea captains who made naval history with skill and courage. The brief 300-year period of sailing ship warfare saw the rise and fall of the Spanish, Dutch and French seapower and the rise of English and American seapower. This is the record of courageous men who left a proud heritage.

DAY OF INFAMY. By WALTER LORD. (New York: Henry Holt, 1957. 243 pages and index, \$3.95.)

With the same detail and drama that he brought to the story of the *Titanic*, Walter Lord has written the story of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that started World War II. He describes the actions of both Japanese and American sailors, officers, soldiers and civilians. War becomes all too vivid in this human document of how history was made.

Current Documents

The Egyptian Syrian Federation: The United Arab Republic

A Syrian-Egyptian proclamation was issued on February 1, 1958, merging the two countries into the United Arab Republic. The full text, as translated into English by the Egyptian Mission to the United Nations, follows:

Proclamation of the United Arab Republic

On February 1, 1958, in a historic session held at Kubbah Palace in Cairo, His Excellency President Shukry El-Kuwatly of Syria and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt met the representatives of the Republics of Syria and Egypt: El Sayed Sabry El-Assaly, El Sayed Abdel Latif El-Baghdady, El Sayed Khaled El-Azm, El Sayed Zakaria Mohieddin, El Sayed Hamed El-Khoga, El Sayed Anwar El-Sadat, El Sayed Fakher El-Kayyaly, El Sayed Maamoun El-Kozbary, El Sayed Hussein El-Shaffei, El Sayed Assaad Haroun, General Abdel Hakim Amer, El Sayed Salah Eddin El-Bitar, El Sayed Kamal-eddin Hussein, El Sayed Khalil El-Kallas, El Sayed Nouredin Tarraf, El Sayed Saleh Akeil, El Sayed Fathy Radwan, General Afif El-Bizry, El Sayed Mahmoud Fawzi, El Sayed Kamal Ramzi Stino, El Sayed Aly Sabri, El Sayed Abdel Rahman El-Azm, and El Sayed Mahmoud Riad.

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the final measures to be taken for the realization of the Arab peoples' will, and the execution of what the Constitutions of both Republics stipulate, namely that the people of each of them form a part of the Arab nation. They, therefore, discussed the decisions unanimously approved by the National Assembly of Egypt and the Syrian House of Representatives that unity should be established between the two countries as a preliminary step towards the realization of complete Arab unity. They also discussed the clear signs manifest in the past few years, that Arab nationalism was the inspiring spirit that dominated the history of Arabs in all their different countries, their common present and the hoped-for future of every Arab.

They came to the conclusion that this unity which is the fruit of Arab nationalism

is the Arabs' path to sovereignty and freedom, that it is one of humanity's gateways to peace and cooperation, and that it is therefore their duty to take this unity with persistence and determination staunch and unwavering out of the circle of wishes and aspirations to where it can be converted into a reality. They came out of this with the conviction that the elements conducive to the success of the union of the two Republics were abundant, particularly recently after their joint struggle which had brought them even closer to one another and made the meaning of nationalism considerably clearer. They stressed the fact that it was a movement for liberation and rehabilitation and that it was a faith in peace and cooperation.

For all this, the participants declare their total agreement, complete faith and deeply rooted confidence in the necessity of uniting Egypt and Syria into one state to be named "The United Arab Republic." They have likewise decided to declare their unanimous agreement on the adoption of a presidential democratic system of government for the Arab Republic. The executive authority shall be vested in the head of the state assisted by the ministers appointed by him and responsible to him. The legislative authority shall be vested in one legislative house. The new Republic shall have one flag, one army, one people who shall remain joined in a unity where all will share equal rights and duties, where all will call for the protection of their country with heart and soul, and compete in the consolidation of its integrity and the insurance of its invulnerability.

His Excellency President Shukry El-Kuwatly and President Gamal Abdel Nasser will each deliver a statement to the people in the Syrian and the Egyptian Parliaments respectively on Wednesday, February 5, 1958,

in which they will announce the decision reached in this meeting and explain the principles of the unity on which this rising young republic shall stand. The peoples of Egypt and Syria shall be called upon to participate in a general plebiscite on the principles of this unity and the choice of the head of the state within thirty days.

In proclaiming these decisions, the participants feel great pride and overwhelming joy in having assisted in taking this positive step on the road to Arab unity and solidarity, a unity which had been for many an epoch and many a generation the Arabs' much cherished hope and greatly coveted

objective.

In deciding on the unity of both nations, the participants declare that their unity aims at the unification of all the Arab peoples and affirm that the door is open for participation to any Arab state desirous of joining them in a union or federation for the purpose of protecting the Arab peoples from harm and evil, strengthening Arab sovereignty, and safeguarding its existence.

May God protect this step we have taken and those which are to follow with His ever vigilant care and benevolence so that the Arab people under the banner of unity may live in dignity and peace.

President Nasser's Address on the Egyptian Syrian Federation

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's speech on February 5, 1958, to the Council of the Nation on the creation of the United Arab Republic is reprinted below as it was translated into English by the Egyptian Mission to the United Nations. On February 21, Nasser's 17-point program was approved by the electorate of both Syria and Egypt. At the same time, Nasser was elected President of the Republic.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

In the lives of nations, there are generations, ordained and solely chosen by destiny to witness decisive turning points in the history of mankind. They are privileged with seeing the decisive stages in life's eternal evolution, those stages that are similar to the pageant of the rising sun, when—at dawn—the great transition from darkness to light takes place. These privileged generations live great moments. They witness moments of great victories of which they were not the only makers and for which they were not the only sacrificers. They witness in fact the glorious result of the interaction of many a factor which worked steadily and incessantly in the darkness and loneliness of night, which laboured indefatigably pushing the seconds one after the other towards the great transition of the hour of dawn.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

This generation of the Egyptian nation is one of these generations ordained by fate to live great moments of transition, moments that are like the pageant of sunrise. We have lived this hour of dawn and witnessed the triumph of the oncoming light over the

darkness of a long pitch-black night. We have witnessed the dawn of our independence, the dawn of our freedom, the rebirth of our pride and dignity, of our strength, of our hope for a happy society. And today, we live a new and glorious dawn for the dawn of our unity is here at last.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

Each dawn we witnessed was preceded with a terribly long night. The dawn of our independence and freedom, of our pride and dignity, of our strength and of our hope was preceded with lengthy nights that extended over hundreds of years of non-stop struggle against the tyranny of colonialism, against oppression and injustice and against weakness. Long nights that our previous generations had to live through, suffering their tremendous odds and hardships so that they would hasten the approach of the glorious moments of this great transition. It is the same with this dawn we are now living. It is without a doubt that the night which preceded the dawn of unity was one of the longest faced by the Arab nation in its struggle, for this hope that has been realized today is the oldest hope we cherished. The unity of the Arab nation goes back to time

immemorial. For this unity existed from the very beginning of the Arab nation's existence, grew on the same soil, lived through the same events, and moved towards the achievement of the same aims, so that when our nation was able to lay down the bases of its existence in the area, and to affirm them, it was certain that unity was rapidly approaching.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

Our struggle for unity was, in actual fact, our struggle for strength, for life. The inseparability of unity and strength has always been one of the most marked characteristics of the history of our nation. For, not once has unity been realized, but it was followed by strength, and not once have we possessed strength, but unity was its natural result. It is not by mere chance that the spreading of dissension among us, and the setting up of frontiers and barriers between us was always the first step taken by whoever wished to control the area. Neither is it by mere chance that the attempts to reach unity in the area were not forsaken during four thousand years, attempts which were made in quest not only of strength, but, as I have said before, of life itself.

The way in which the efforts toward unity were pursued differed with the ages, but the aim remained the same, and the end in view was always the realization of these moments we are living now. The area was unified by the force of arms at the time when arms were the means by which humanity in its infancy made itself understood. Then it was unified by the holy prophecies when divine messages began to descend upon the earth to guide humanity. Again it was unified by the power of faith, when the banners of Islam rose on high, bearing the new message of God, in confirmation of those preceding it, and calling for the establishment of justice. It was unified by the interaction of the various elements in a single Arab nation. The whole region was united for reasons of mutual security, to face an imperialism coming from Europe, and bearing the cross in order to disguise its ambitions behind the facade of Christianity.

The meaning of unity was never clearer than when the Christianity of the Arab

Orient joined the ranks of Islam to battle the Crusaders until victory. The area was also united in suffering when it was subjected to the marauding of the Ottoman invasion, and the curtain of ignorance was drawn around it, impeding its progress, and standing in the path of its reawakening at the time when the age of Renaissance was under way in Europe. Moreover, the area was drawn together in the face of imperialism, just as it was united in rebelling against it in its several forms. With unison in revolt also came unison in sacrifice, for the gallows that were set up by Jamal Pasha in Damascus, the capital of Syria, were not much different from the gallows erected by Lord Cromer in Dinshway, here in Egypt.

My compatriot Assembly-members:

Hence, we see that union is a reality, something to strive for, something which we live. Thus we see that the struggle for power, the struggle for life, is consummated and realized only through unity, since unity is only through power and life. So we see that the history of Cairo, in its main lines, is the history also of Damascus. The details may differ, but the essential factors are the same: the same states, the same invaders, the same kings, the same hurts, and the same martyrs. When it seemed at times that Egypt had estranged itself from Arab thought, and severed its ties with the area, after the French expedition against Egypt, and later under the rule of the Mohamed Aly dynasty, the position was not what it seemed to be on the face of it. The estrangement was but a superficial one, and the isolation was in name only. As for actual fact, and reality, these show that what God had brought together may not be sundered, and what nature had connected may not be severed. In evidence, it may be recalled that the army of peasants that went, under Ibrahim Pasha, to liberate Syria from Ottoman oppression, styled itself "The Arab Army." Again, Cairo, which in the second half of the nineteenth century began opening its windows to the breeze of renaissance, became the stronghold of liberal thought in the Arab East. Soon liberals in Syria and elsewhere in the region came to regard it as their sanctuary and stronghold, from which they could diffuse thought in order to mobilize and arouse.

Indeed, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Cairo underwent a complete change. It became with Damascus the headquarters of secret societies which started to struggle against the might of Istanbul's sultans, sparing no pains and shrinking from no sacrifice, for the liberation of the Arab nation. Such was real unity, and with the exception of unity, all was make-believe and bunkum. Thus it was clear that this area, if left to be inspired by its nature, to obey its own intuitions, to listen to the beats of its own heart, its move towards unity was fated and inevitable, and this was what happened.

Fellow countrymen:

When Syria gained its complete independence, she looked forward to Egypt. So also was the case with Egypt. On gaining its complete independence, Egypt likewise looked to Syria. The affinity, nay the sameness and harmony, was absolute, even before the Arab League Charter was signed, nay even after the charter was signed and certain forces wished that it should remain mere ink on paper. Indeed, there were reactions in Syria to every movement in Egypt, just as the reactions of all that happened in Syria resounded in Cairo. The effervescence that followed the Second World War, heralding the beginning of those monster liberation movements in Africa and Asia, began to boil simultaneously in Egypt and Syria. Those violent commotions, all invariably followed by strenuous efforts to change conditions, striving after the best, the ideal, likewise arose simultaneously in both Egypt and Syria. That rapid rush to join the Palestine War, animated by chivalry and inspired by faith, but without arms, started in both Egypt and Syria, just as the effects of that war, foremost amongst which was that state of vigilance to which we were aroused, much like the shudder of a man startled from slumber scorched by fire, were felt in both Cairo and Damascus. It is also most amazing to find that the battles fought by Damascus, particularly if we restrict our account only to those fought during the past few months, were the same as those Cairo fought—the military pacts battle, the arms battle, the nonalignment battle, the conspiracies battle and last, but not least, the battle of economic liberation. Syria fought

the Suez Canal battle with as much vehemence and forcefulness as Port Said did. Egypt also fought against the threats aimed at Syria and opposed them heartily while a section of the Egyptian army took its place by the Syrian army with their Syrian brethren. All this was amazing but it was not wholly incidental.

The road to this union between Egypt and Syria was paved by a number of far-reaching factors. These were identity of nature, history, race, language, religions, beliefs, as well as common security and independence. The road was also paved by sacrifices and suffering through the three instruments of oppression: incarceration, exile and the scaffold. All this was instrumental in bringing about the dawn of freedom we are now witnessing after a long night.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

The herald of dawn was the decision taken by the Syrian House of Representatives and this Assembly to act immediately for the realization of the unity of Egypt and Syria. This decision was the expression of a fact that cannot be ignored and the echo of a divine call that will not be denied. This fact did not exist in Damascus and Cairo only and this divine call was not confined to these limits: it was present in every part of the Arab nation. It was the roar of the current which had been defined by Arab nationalism. This is how final talks were started in Cairo to give this actual reality its outward shape.

These talks were a new experience in history. This meeting was not due to the will of rulers or politicians. It was the result of pressure, persistence and stubborn purpose on the part of the people. It was for the best that we had left matters till they reached this phase as it was imperious that the peoples should be given a full chance to reaffirm their beliefs; to allow these beliefs to crystallize so that subsequent events and developments might confirm that unity was the road to strength, the road to life.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

The significance of the talks which were held in Cairo and the arrival of the valiant champion and pioneer of the cause of Arab

unity, Shukry El-Kuwatly, in Egypt accompanied by a delegation of his comrades-in-arms, was that the hour, long-awaited and struggled for by our forefathers, had finally struck, and that it had been given to our generation to witness the rise of the new dawn after the long, dreary night. It meant that what we had pictured in our dreams had come to be an actual fact and what had been divided by artificially-created dissension had returned to the natural state God had given it at its birth, in unity and harmony. It meant that the chains had burst, that the obstacles had been destroyed, that the barriers had fallen and that the scattered fragments and segments were finally on the point of reintegration. It meant that Syria and Egypt had decided to bear the historical responsibility laid on them by the fact of their being two Arab countries which are ruled by the will of their peoples, and which have achieved real sovereignty and complete independence. This was the significance of the talks held in Cairo.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

Our talks concluded with the official proclamation of the union, and its signature on Saturday February 1st, 1958. This proclamation has been deposited in the Secretariat of your Assembly, and its result was the unification of Egypt and Syria into a state named the United Arab Republic. This republic will adopt the system of a presidential democracy in which the executive authority will be vested in the head of the state, assisted by ministers appointed by him, and responsible to him. The legislative authority will be vested in a common council. The republic will have a common flag, a common people, a common army, in a unity where all will share equal rights and duties.

We then came to an agreement concerning the following principles upon which the republic is to stand during the period of transition.

1. The United Arab Republic is a democratic, independent, sovereign republic, its peoples are part of the Arab nation.

2. Liberties are safeguarded within the limits of the law.

3. General suffrage is the right of all citizens as prescribed by the law. Their partici-

pation in public life is a civic obligation.

4. The legislative authority is vested in a house to be called the National Assembly. Members of the house are to be specified and appointed by decree from the President of the republic. Half of the members of the house at least must be appointed from the members of the Syrian House of Representatives and the Egyptian National Assembly.

5. The executive authority is vested in the President of the republic.

6. Private property is safeguarded, while its social function is organized by the law. Confiscation of property is only allowed for the public good in return for adequate indemnification according to the law.

7. Taxes are to be levied, modified or cancelled only by law. None can be exempted from payment except in cases cited in the law.

8. Judiciary is independent with no power over it save that of the law.

9. All questions decided by laws in force in Syria and Egypt remain valid within the districts prescribed for them on their issuance.

10. The United Republic consists of two regions, Syria and Egypt.


11. An executive council will be set up in each region directed by a chairman, appointed by presidential decree, assisted by ministers appointed by the President at the recommendation of the chairman.

12. The authorities of the Executive Council are defined by Presidential decrees.

13. All international treaties and agreements concluded by Syria and Egypt respectively with other countries remain valid within the regional limits prescribed on their conclusion and in accordance with the principles of international law.

14. Public services and administrative systems existing at the time of application of this system remain valid in both Syria and Egypt till their re-organization and unification by Presidential decrees.

15. Citizens are to form a National Union which should aim at realizing national goals and to stimulate the efforts made to build the nation on sound political, social and economic bases. Methods to be followed by the Union are defined by Presidential decree.



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16. Measures shall be taken setting up a permanent Constitution for the United Arab Republic.

17. A plebiscite over the Union and the choice of the President of the United Arab Republic shall take place on February 21, 1958.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

Here I must pause for a while to talk about the Constitution of January 16, the greatest result of which was your Assembly. This Constitution is immortal. It is not plausible that the revolution that set it and proclaimed that it emanated from the depths of the people's will and from the substance of their experience would accept that this Constitution be dropped or forgotten. But the Constitution, as I told you when I had the honor of addressing you on January 16, is not merely static articles but a dynamic ever-wakeful force working for the future we are trying to achieve, that it is the framework that gives order to our movement and unity to our lines. However, a great movement has occurred that merged two peoples of one nation converting them into one united republic, therefore necessitating that the framework be pushed back so that it may embrace the whole of the new merger. It has therefore become necessary for the Constitution of January 16 to commence experiencing a larger and broader life, and it follows that your Assembly which was the greatest outcome of this Constitution, should undergo the same experience.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

I have once told you that we consider you the new Revolution Council. This we do in the belief that the Revolution is continuing. It is indeed heartening that the experiment of the last few months, that is, ever since your Assembly started functioning, has foretold of true and full cooperation that aimed at the preservation of the nation's interest and endeavored to build a new society. It is my duty to tell you in these decisive moments in the history of our nation that you have always been more than what we wished and hoped you would be, and that your sharing in shouldering the

responsibilities was the greatest assistance we had on the road towards the accomplishment of our objectives. It gladdens my heart that the great evolution we are now living will not bring our companionship to an end. On the contrary, it will strengthen the ties between us, and make us approach the tasks lying ahead with more zeal, greater strength and dearer unity and solidarity.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

I consider it my duty, however, at this stage, to inform you and the people of the United Arab Republic, that the way ahead of us is long and difficult. Travelling along it will not be an easy, pleasurable thing, but it will be burdened with troubles, difficulties and struggles. But all this is but a fair price to pay for the realization of our hopes. Our troubles will be redoubled by that which we will meet on our way forward. Those whom the union of Egypt and Syria does not please, whose plans it does not suit, will not accept it calmly or inactively, but many attempts, efforts and maneuvers will be made to destroy it. Because of this, I am telling you from now, that we must move with our eyes wide open, fully conscious of things around us.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

We are living in a glorious period, but we must also realize that it is a period fraught with danger. Perhaps our uncurbed yearning will prove to be the greatest dangers we have to face, as our dreams, hopes, aspirations and goals have been thwarted for centuries by the barriers imperialism has created—the barriers and obstacles came crashing down when the presence of imperialism was removed from our land. Thus were set free all the dreams, hopes, desires, and aims which had been incarcerated. These were let loose with the impetus of a long confinement, as a flood is loosed forth. That is the genuine interpretation of the rapid course of events in our generation, and

it is a natural situation after many generations of confinement, but at the same time it is also a note of caution. It is a warning that one of our primary duties is, through wisdom, to dam our aspirations, and gradually to open the sluices to permit the flow. This flow must be regulated, otherwise it may overwhelm us as a strong, high flood.

My compatriot Assembly-members:

I am certain that the experience we are undergoing today shall culminate in the realization of that desired for it by those who have striven for its consummation throughout the dark and desolate night. What strengthens me in my conviction is that God, the omnipotent, has drawn our heart close to the heart of a true companion for the journey, a true bulwark in the battle, a true intimate and a dear brother. The people of Syria, tempered by long experience, trial after trial, have proved themselves to be the vanguard of Arab nationalism, the spearhead of freedom in its mighty advance and the faithful guardian of its glorious heritage.

Fellow countrymen:

A new hope has loomed on the horizon of this East. A new state has sprung from its heart. Indeed, it is a great state in this East. It is neither an intruder, nor a usurper. It is neither hostile nor unfriendly. It is a state that protects but does not threaten, a state that safeguards, but does not squander, a state that strengthens, but does not weaken, a state that unites but does not separate, a state that is peace-loving, but does not forfeit, a state that upholds a friend, but rebuffs an enemy, a state that takes no sides, and shuns extremism, a state that upholds justice and supports peace, a state that provides, as far as lies within the limits of its possibility, for her own prosperity, that of neighboring countries and of all humanity.

Fellow countrymen, members of the National Assembly:

May God bless you, bless your unity and protect your United Arab Republic.



Eight countries—the United States, Cuba, Brazil, France the U.S.S.R., India, Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa—hold about 90 per cent of the world's total reserves of iron ore.—From a *Twentieth Century Fund Survey*.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REVISIONIST BOOKS

Dealing with The Two World Wars and Their Aftermath

With Brief Comments

"With the publication in 1948 of his [Charles A. Beard's] *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War*, revisionism reached the status of a mature historical interpretation of events that no serious student of prewar policy could ignore."

Dr. Louis Morton (Chief of the Pacific Section of the United States Army Office of Military History), in "Pearl Harbor in Perspective: A Bibliographical Survey," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (April, 1955), pp. 461-465.

Although this is a modest list of books limited to the outstanding volumes on the subject which have been published in English, it will prove an "eye-opener" to most teachers and students of history.

Few of the important revisionist books dealing with the causes, merits and results of the second World War have been reviewed in historical journals or the book review sections of leading newspapers and periodicals. When they have been reviewed, their nature and contents have rarely been fairly stated and appraised.

It has almost universally been taken for granted that, however important revisionist research and publication may have been in setting the record straight in regard to the first World War, there is no revisionist issue or problem relative to the second World War.

The facts already well established demonstrate, however, that the revisionist correction of wartime illusions and prejudices relative to the second World War is far more drastic and revolutionary than the import of the revisionist publications which appeared between 1920 and 1935. The works cited in this Bibliography will enable historians who seek the truth to undertake this novel and exciting intellectual adventure in a realistic and informed manner.

The majority of the books listed in this Bibliography deal with the second World War. In the light of the fact that there has been a recent effort on the part of some writers and publishers to discredit the revisionism of 1920-1935 and return to the myths and propaganda of 1914-1919, the Bibliography leads off with an ample selection of the chief books which, in an earlier generation, set forth the assured facts on the events that followed June, 1914.

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A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of February, 1958, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Middle East (see **United Arab Republic**, the **Arab Federation**, and **Tunisia**.)

Nato

February 5—Dr. Norman F. Ramsey, American nuclear physicist, is named as scientific adviser to the Atlantic Alliance.

February 14—Dr. I. I. Rabi is appointed chief U.S. member of Nato's new Science Committee.

February 17—General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, says that "Any plan or proposal which reduces or limits our ability to provide for the defense of our people and territory without giving us some positive security to offset this . . . must be rejected."

West Europe

February 3—Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg sign six documents establishing the Benelux Economic Union. The treaty provides for: free movement of persons, goods, services and capital among the three countries; coordination of economic, financial and social policies; unification of trade policies.

United Nations

February 6—Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld reveals that he has been invited to visit the U.S.S.R.

ARAB FEDERATION, THE

February 1—It is reported that Jordan has proposed to the Iraqi and Saudi Arabian governments a federation of the 3 countries.

February 14—King Faisal II of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan announce the

formation of the Arab Federation, a union of the 2 countries with Faisal as head of the federal union and a Cabinet to be composed equally of Iraqis and Jordanians. Each monarch retains sovereignty in his own country. The question of Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact is settled by an agreement that treaties signed before the union are only binding on the signatory party.

February 17—The Iraqi parliament approves the union of Iraq and Jordan.

February 18—The Jordanian parliament approves the merger of its country with Iraq.

ARGENTINA

February 23—In the first free elections for president since the regime of Juan D. Perón, the leader of the Leftist wing of the Radical Civic Union, Arturo Frondizi, leads by a margin of almost 2 to 1 over his strongest opponent, Ricardo Balbin.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Canada

February 1—The Canadian Parliament is dissolved; a general election is scheduled for March 31.

February 2—The Canadian election campaign begins. Major issues concern unemployment, fiscal policy and trade.

Ceylon

February 4—Ceylon marks the tenth anniversary of its independence.

February 7—Ceylon signs an aid agreement with the U.S., providing American aid for six development projects.

February 8—Ceylon and the U.S.S.R. sign a trade agreement, valid for one year and automatically renewable.

February 25—Ceylon signs a technical aid agreement with the U.S.S.R.

Great Britain

February 6—The House of Commons defeats a Labor motion attacking the social and industrial policies of the Government, with a vote of 318 to 251.

February 9—Replying to Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan says he will take part in a summit meeting if there is "a reasonable prospect of achieving concrete results on specific issues."

February 12—In a parliamentary by-election in Rochdale, the Conservatives lose a seat they have held since 1951. The Labor candidate wins by a margin of 4,530.

February 13—In its annual White Paper on defense, the Government warns that any attack from the Soviet Union will be met with strategic nuclear weapons.

Voting 305 to 251, the House of Commons approves the admission of women to membership in the House of Lords. The upper House has already approved the measure.

February 18—The Government announces that charges for the National Health Service will rise in July.

It is reported that Winston Churchill, 83, is ill in Nice, France.

February 19—A statement released by his physician reveals that Winston Churchill is suffering from pneumonia and pleurisy.

February 22—The U.S. and Great Britain sign an agreement providing that the U.S. will supply intermediate-range ballistic missiles for four launching bases in Britain.

February 24—The Commons hears that the U.S. will supply Britain with missiles able to reach Moscow, Leningrad and Odessa.

India

February 4—Japan agrees to give India a \$50 million loan over a three-year period.

February 13—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accepts the resignation of Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari; Krishnamachari is under fire for his role in the scandal involving the nationalized Life Insurance Corporation. For the time being, Nehru will take charge of the Finance Ministry.

Pakistan

February 1—Pakistanis welcome King Zahir, Shah of Afghanistan. He is the guest of President Iskander Mirza.

February 6—Aly Khan is named Ambassador to the U.N.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE**Cyprus**

February 6—Leaflets distributed by the political wing of the E.O.K.A. declare an end to the truce with the British authorities.

February 7—The British Foreign Office announces that Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd will fly to Athens for talks with the Greek Government on February 10.

February 13—Governor of Cyprus Sir Hugh Foot calls on Archbishop Makarios in Athens.

February 18—Foreign Secretary Lloyd tells the Commons that an acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem seems possible.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

February 8—Prime Minister R. S. Garfield Todd is deposed by his own party after a difference of opinion over racial policy. Mr. Todd has advocated rapid advancement of Negroes in Rhodesia. Sir Edgar Whitehead, Minister for Rhodesia and Nyasaland Affairs at the British Embassy in Washington, will become the new prime minister.

CHINA (THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC)

February 1—The National People's Congress opens by debarring 54 "rightist" delegates from its sessions. Only 970 of the 1,226 delegates are in attendance.

February 11—Premier Chou En-lai resigns his post of foreign minister, retaining only the premiership. Marshal Chen Yi is named his successor. The closing session of the National People's Congress approves this change along with others in 12 other ministerial posts.

February 19—It is announced that Communist Chinese troops in North Korea will

be completely withdrawn by the end of the year.

COSTA RICA

February 2—Costa Ricans go to the polls to elect a president as well as municipal leaders.

February 4—Practically complete returns indicate that the National Union party candidate, Mario Echandi, has been elected president.

February 18—The election tribunal refuses to confirm the election of Echandi to the presidency because 133 of the 1,983 ballot boxes are missing.

CUBA

February 16—Nine rebels are killed in a clash with government forces in Oriente Province, according to army reports. Two soldiers are also reported dead.

February 25—Rebel chief Fidel Castro sends a peace plan to President Fulgencio Batista: he calls for the removal of Cuban forces from Oriente Province to be followed by elections supervised by the Organization of American States.

FRANCE

February 12—By a vote of 335 to 179, the National Assembly supports the French attack on the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef on February 8 as legitimate self-defense against Algerian rebels who take refuge in Tunisia. (See also *Tunisia*.)

February 14—Foreign Minister Christian Pineau admits that neither he, Premier Felix Gaillard, or Minister for Algeria Robert LaCoste were notified in advance of the bombing attack.

February 18—Spokesmen for France's Central African territories declare that they want independence within the framework of union with France.

FRENCH EMPIRE

Algeria

February 5—Algerian rebels accuse the

French of imposing the death sentence on captured Algerians in violation of the Geneva Convention on guerilla warfare.

February 14—It is confirmed that all 9 members of the Algerian National Liberation Front's Coordination and Executive Committee are in Cairo to attend a council of war meeting.

French authorities claim that 400 Algerian rebels entered Algeria from Tunisia last night, carrying with them arms and ammunition.

February 27—In some of the worst fighting since the start of the Algerian war, 92 French soldiers are killed in 5 days of fighting. Over 150 rebels are slain.

The Cameroon

February 16—Premier Marie M'bida resigns.

GERMANY (EAST)

February 8—The East German Communist party news organ announces that 3 members of the Central Committee and Politburo have been expelled following a 4-day meeting of the Central Committee. The 3 are charged with wanting to liberalize the party.

February 10—A bill to decentralize East German industry is introduced into the parliament. Eight ministries are eliminated. A new body, the Control Organ of the Ministers Council for Planning and Guidance of the Economy, will take over planning and supervision.

GERMANY (WEST)

February 5—The German government offers to give Great Britain the equivalent of \$280 million in armament orders over the next 3 years, the money to be at the disposal of the British government. The offer is presented to Nato Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak as an alternative to the British demand that Germany contribute the equivalent of \$140 million to the support of the British Army of the Rhine.

February 19—West Germany rejects the Polish plan to include it in a neutral

Central European zone free of atomic weapons.

GREECE

February 27—Two Cabinet ministers resign because Premier Constantine Karamanlis drafted a new electoral law without consulting his Cabinet.

February 28—Two new Cabinet members are sworn in.

GUATEMALA

February 9—Official figures reveal that Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes received the largest vote in the elections of January 19; Cruz Salazar won the second largest number. Since neither candidate pooled a simple majority, Congress must vote between the two leading candidates.

February 12—Congress elects Ydigoras to the presidency.

HUNGARY

February 3—Foreign Minister Imre Horvath of Hungary dies.

February 15—Dr. Endre Sik, First Deputy Foreign Minister, is named to replace Horvath. Major General Pal Ilku, chief political Commissar of the Hungarian Army, is appointed Deputy Minister of Culture and a member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist party.

February 19—Former bishop Janos Peter is named Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary.

INDONESIA

February 10—A Revolutionary Council, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein, issues an ultimatum to the Sukarno government demanding the formation of a new Communist-free Cabinet. The rebels reject Sukarno's "guided democracy." It is also demanded that former Vice-President Mohammed Hatta be named to the new Cabinet.

February 11—The Cabinet rejects the demand for its dissolution. It also orders the discharge of the 4 colonels who head the dissidents in Central Sumatra.

In a news conference, United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles intimates that the present government in Indonesia does not really reflect "the real interest and desires of the people" and hence is somewhat less than democratic.

February 12—Indonesia responds to the Dulles criticism with a warning to outside powers not to interfere in its affairs.

February 15—The Central Sumatran Revolutionary Council, under the direction of Colonel Husein, sets up a revolutionary government: the Cabinet is composed of various party leaders, all anti-Communist, headed by Dr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who has been named premier. The action is taken following the Sukarno government's rejection of the ultimatum issued by the Council. The rebels declare their willingness to turn their power over to Dr. Mohammed Hatta and Hamengku Buwono of Jogjakarta.

February 16—President Sukarno returns from a 6-week tour of Southeast Asia. The premier and 5 Cabinet ministers of the revolutionary government are accused of treason and their arrests are ordered.

February 17—The central government blockades 4 ports of Central Sumatra.

February 21—It is reported that the Indonesian military has dropped 7 bombs and destroys a bridge in Central Sumatra.

February 22—The Indonesian Air Force bombs the co-capitals of the revolutionary government, Padang and Bukittinggi, hitting rebel radio stations in both places.

February 24—Top Indonesian Army officials demand the "complete surrender" of the rebel government.

ISRAEL

February 16—Three Israeli casualties are reported following clashes with the new Arab Federation in the Israeli demilitarized zone on Mount Scopus.

ITALY

February 5—The Chamber of Deputies approves Italy's foreign policy of alliance and friendship with the West. Implicit in the approval is consent for the establishment of U.S. intermediate-range missile bases

on Italian soil in accord with the decision reached at the Nato conference in December.

JAPAN

February 7—The Cabinet approves a 5 billion yen aid fund to be used for economic development of those Southeast Asian nations desiring economic cooperation with Japan.

February 8—Scientists at Osaka University announce that they have successfully completed Japan's first nuclear reaction experiment.

February 28—Talks scheduled to open tomorrow between Japan and South Korea are postponed because of a dispute over the repatriation of each other's imprisoned nationals.

KOREA

February 17—It is announced that a South Korean National airliner disappeared over the truce line between North and South Korea into North Korea. The United Nations Command demands the return of the plane by the North Koreans.

The Communist radio admits that the South Korean plane has landed in North Korea. North Koreans at the Military Armistice Commission Secretariat say that South Korea must bargain directly with them for the return of the plane.

LIBERIA

February 12—Racial discrimination is outlawed by parliamentary action in this Negro republic.

MOROCCO

February 1—France and Morocco reach an agreement, according to the Moroccan Minister of National Economy, whereby Morocco is to remain in the franc zone while pursuing an independent financial policy. The agreement provides for a compensation system to keep down prices of essential imports and for the removal of the Moroccan Bureau of Currency Exchange from Paris to Rabat.

February 19—It is reported that Spanish planes have bombed Tabelkoukt, the northwest corner of the Ifni enclave in Morocco. It is also reported that Spain dropped 500 parachuters to seek out mountain guerillas.

PARAGUAY

February 9—President Alfredo Stroesser is re-elected for a 5-year term. In today's elections for president and Congress, only one slate of candidates is presented to the voters as only one political party is allowed in the country.

PERU

February 4—It is announced that striking policemen in Arequipa and Cuzco have returned to work because a bill to increase their wages has been introduced into the Congress.

POLAND

February 2—Voters go to the polls to elect for local councils. 205,000 seats on the various councils are competed for by 301,000 candidates; the voters are given a limited choice of candidates.

February 7—The Ministry of Finance bows before public protests over last month's action raising the price of travel to West Europe to 5000 zlotys. The Ministry recommends widespread exemptions for many people that would reduce the cost to 1,000 zlotys.

February 14—Poland issues a paper to Western nations outlining the Rapacki plan for an atomic free zone in Central Europe.

February 15—The U.S. and Poland sign a \$98 million agreement: \$73 million of U.S. agricultural surpluses is made available for Polish purchase; \$25 million in credit for the purchase of U.S. raw materials and equipment for Polish consumer goods industries is granted.

February 27—At the opening of the plenary meeting of the Communist party's Central Committee, the decision to dismiss all superfluous workers from industry is announced. Huge unemployment, it is feared, will result.

RUMANIA

February 25—Premier Chivu Stoica declares that his country is prepared to spend \$100 million in the U.S. for industrial equipment and machinery but difficulties over export licenses might force Rumania to find other markets. He wants the U.S. to guarantee that the licenses would not be revoked.

THE SUDAN

February 17—Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohammed Mahgoub declares that Egypt has laid claim to Sudanese territory north of the 22nd parallel in return for which it offers the Sudan a small piece of land south of the 22nd parallel. The Sudan has been given until the end of the week to relinquish the disputed border territory above the 22nd parallel.

February 18—Egypt demands that the Sudan remove its forces from Halaib, a small fishing village in the disputed area claimed by both Egypt and Syria. Foreign Minister Mahgoub arrives in Cairo for talks with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

February 20—Talks between Nasser and Mahgoub break down.

The Sudanese government asks the U.N. to consider the question of Egyptian aggression towards the Sudan.

February 21—The Security Council postpones taking action on the Sudanese question. The Cairo spokesman announces Nasser's intention to put off settling the border question until after the Sudanese elections to be held next week.

February 22—Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia discloses that he has sent an appeal to Nasser and to the Sudanese government to postpone settlement of the border dispute pending next week's elections in the Sudan.

February 24—Premier Abdullah Khalil accuses Egypt of interference in the forthcoming Sudanese elections. It is reported that the Sudan has also asked the Security Council to reconvene to discuss the border question between Egypt and the Sudan. The Sudan maintains that Egyptian troops

are stationed within the Sudanese border area.

February 27—Sudanese voters go to the polls to elect a parliament in the first free elections since Sudan gained its independence.

TUNISIA (Also see *France*.)

February 8—Twenty-five French planes bomb the Tunisian border village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef because of Tunisian "cobelligerence" in the war with Algeria. The casualty list numbers 68 dead and 100 casualties.

February 9—Tunisia lodges a protest with the U.N. over the French attack on the village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef.

U.S. Secretary of State Dulles calls the Tunisian Ambassador in for talks on the French bombing of a Tunisian village. The U.S. State Department is embarrassed over the incident: the French used U.S. planes in the attack.

The French Commander in Algeria, Lieutenant General Raoul Salan, declares that French planes destroyed only military objectives in the village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef. Six French newspapermen visiting the village file a statement which contradicts Salan: they assert that private dwellings, stores, a school and other public buildings were hit by the planes.

February 10—Mongi Slim, Tunisia's Ambassador to the U.S., tells U.S. Secretary Dulles that his government has decided to appeal to the U.N. Security Council on the bombing of a border village.

February 12—Tunisia demands the removal of all French forces from its soil.

February 13—France refuses to negotiate with Tunisia on the Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef incident while Tunisia continues to blockade and to threaten French troops and civilians there.

Tunisia formally requests the U.N. Security Council to consider the French act of aggression against its border village.

February 15—France agrees to accept the good offices of the U.S. in helping to settle its dispute with Tunisia.

February 16—Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba instructs his Ambassador to prepare a new complaint before the Security Council charging France with threatening

North African peace by the war with Algeria. Hopes dim that the U.S. offer of good offices will avert Security Council debate on the Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef bombing.

February 17—France and Tunisia accept the U.S.-British offer to use their good offices to help resolve the Paris-Tunis dispute. President Bourguiba, out of line with his earlier statement, has not ordered the removal of his complaint from the Security Council, which he had said was contingent upon French acceptance of the offer of U.S. good offices.

February 18—The Security Council postpones consideration of the French and Tunisian complaints pending U.S.-British action to mediate the dispute.

February 19—The U.S. State Department appoints Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy to negotiate with France and Tunisia on their border dispute.

France decides to establish a No Man's Land 200 miles long and 15 miles wide on the Algerian side of the Tunisian-Algerian border. Such action will uproot 70,000-80,000 civilians.

February 20—Tunisian police close 4 French consulates and a chancellery following an 8-day demand by Tunisia that France evacuate the posts.

February 22—France reiterates her stand that the good offices of the U.S. do not apply to the Algerian issue.

February 25—President Bourguiba tells U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy that one of the important issues to be discussed by the U.S. and Britain is the Algerian war.

February 27—President Bourguiba voices a strong protest over the French plan to establish a No Man's Land along the Algerian border.

THE U.S.S.R.

February 2—Poland and the Soviet Union announce support of the Rapacki plan; they agree to participate in "an effective system of control" that would guarantee an atomic free Central European zone.

February 3—The Kremlin voices agreement that talks between Eastern and Western governments will have to precede a Summit conference. It proposes that pre-

paratory talks take place through regular diplomatic channels rather than at a foreign ministers' conference.

The U.S. accepts the Soviet invitation to send observers to its elections scheduled for March 6.

February 7—It is reported that some collective farms have already begun the purchase of tractors from the state tractor stations as proposed by Communist chief Nikita Khrushchev in a recent speech. The Central Committee has not yet made the sale of these tractors official.

February 19—Former Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Georgi N. Zaroubin is appointed Deputy Foreign Minister.

February 27—The Central Committee, it is reported, yesterday approved Khrushchev's plan to eliminate state machine tractor stations.

February 28—The Soviet Union gives the U.S. an outline preparing a plan for an East-West heads-of-government meeting.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

February 1—Egypt and Syria announce the merger of the two countries into the United Arab Republic.

February 5—The Egyptian Assembly accepts Nasser's 17-point program for the new republic of Syria and Egypt. The National Assembly nominates Nasser as presidential candidate for the new Arab Republic. (See pages 239-245 of this issue.)

February 21—Syrians and Egyptians vote on a plebiscite to establish the United Arab Republic.

February 22—By almost unanimous vote, the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic is approved by the citizenry of the two countries. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt receives an overwhelming vote for president of the Republic.

February 27—President Nasser attacks the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan as "false."

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

February 21—Secretary of Agriculture Ezra

Taft Benson says that 1958 support prices for oats, barley, sorghum grain and rye will be close to 1957 levels. These feed grains will be supported at 70 per cent of parity. No rate has been announced for corn.

The Economy

February 11—The Commerce and Labor Departments announce that unemployment was twice the normal seasonal figure in January, reaching 4,494,000, 5.8 per cent of the civilian labor force.

February 12—In a public statement, the President says that "a pickup in job opportunities" should begin in March, and that this "should mark the beginning of the end of the downturn in our economy, provided we apply ourselves with confidence to the job ahead."

February 13—Eleven Democratic governors urge President Eisenhower to adopt "a practical program" to stop the recession.

February 19—The Federal Reserve Board reduces reserve requirements of member banks by one half of one per cent, freeing about \$500 million from the required reserves.

February 25—The Bureau of Labor Statistics says that consumer prices rose to 122.3 points in January (base, 1947-1949, 100); this is a record and the steepest increase since July, 1956.

February 26—President Eisenhower says that "it will take some time to stop the recession."

February 28—Unemployment of those covered by unemployment insurance reached a record in mid-February, says the Department of Labor; the total is 3,130,200.

Foreign Policy

February 2—President Eisenhower gets a note from Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin about a possible heads-of-government meeting.

February 4—Minnesota Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, asks the President to take a more positive and more limited approach to the U.S.S.R. on the disarmament subject.

February 7—It is revealed in Washington that President Eisenhower has told his disarmament advisor, Harold E. Stassen, that his disarmament job is going to end shortly.

February 11—Secretary of State Dulles says that a foreign ministers' meeting is not a prerequisite to a summit conference.

February 14—The U.S. notes that the Iraq-Jordan federation is a matter for the Arab states to decide.

February 17—President Eisenhower's latest letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin is made public; the President urges the Russians to stop "repetitive public debate" and work to arrange a summit conference.

February 18—U.S. officials in Washington declare that the U.S. will ask the 16 members of the U.N. who fought in the Korean War to meet to consider Red China's announced intent of withdrawing its troops from Korea.

State Department Press officer Lincoln White says that Poland's plan for a zone in Central Europe free of nuclear weapons (the "Rapacki" plan) has "serious disadvantages from the standpoint of the security of the free world."

February 19—President Eisenhower asks Congress for an authorization of \$3,942,100,000 in foreign aid and says that any sharp reduction in this aid would mean a "beleaguered America."

February 25—Speaking to a Conference on Foreign Aspects of United States National Security, President Eisenhower and former President Harry Truman ask Congress for a strong foreign aid program. They speak at different times and do not meet.

February 27—The State Department announces that Secretary of State Dulles has asked four private citizens to advise him on disarmament. They are: Alfred M. Gruenther, Robert M. Lovett, John J. McCloy and Walter Bedell Smith. James J. Wadsworth is to represent the U.S. in future disarmament negotiations, succeeding Harold Stassen.

Government

February 2—A staff memorandum prepared

for the House subcommittee investigating the Federal Communications Commission says that the chairman of the F.C.C., John C. Doerfer, is guilty of official misconduct because of a payment he received from a broadcasting industry organization.

February 3—John C. Doerfer of the F.C.C. denies charges that he is guilty of misconduct.

February 4—The United Fruit Company and the Government settle an anti-trust suit after four years; the company agrees to set up a competitor in the banana industry.

February 7—Clifton Reginald Wharton is sworn in as Minister to Rumania; he is the first Negro to be named head of an overseas diplomatic mission.

February 10—Dr. Bernard Schwartz is discharged as chief counsel of the House subcommittee investigating regulatory agencies. Dr. Schwartz has charged that the committee members tried to "whitewash" the investigation.

February 11—The White House reveals that the Post Office Department will offer a \$2 billion program to modernize the physical plant of the Post Office Department.

February 12—Representative Oren Harris, Democrat, of Arkansas, takes full charge of the investigation of regulatory agencies and promises "the most thorough investigation Capitol Hill has ever seen."

February 13—President and Mrs. Eisenhower arrive in Georgia for a 10-day rest.

February 16—The Census Bureau reports that in 1957 the population of the U.S. increased by about three million for the second year in a row; the population is estimated at 172,790,000.

February 21—The Radio Corporation of America is indicted for multiple violations of anti-trust laws.

February 26—President Eisenhower says that he and Vice-President Richard Nixon have reached a "clear understanding" on a course of action in case of a presidential disability.

February 28—The Senate approves a measure raising postal rates and pay for postal and other government workers. Differences between House and Senate versions of this bill will be worked out in committee.

The chairman of the House subcommittee investigating regulatory agencies suggests that Richard A. Mack's resignation would be the "best possible service" he could render the Federal Communications Commission.

Labor

February 5—Building contractors and union representatives agree to work toward eliminating featherbedding and other abuses after three years of joint study of construction costs.

February 7—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. gives affiliates until April 15 to comply with anti-racketeering codes, in an effort to guarantee democratic union rule.

Dairy farmers in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York, numbering some 3,500, join the 1.4 million-member International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

February 8—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. asks affiliated unions to work for higher wages and consequently increased mass purchasing power to cure the recession.

February 20—Walter P. Reuther suggests a moratorium on income tax withholding to help combat recession.

Military Policy

February 1—It is reported that the first U.S. scientific space satellite, the Explorer, is "working nicely."

February 4—At a White House Conference, Republican Congress leaders learn that President Eisenhower has ordered a special study of the issue of civilian vs. military control of outer space research. Scientific adviser James R. Killian Jr. has been assigned to this study.

February 5—The second failure of the Navy's Vanguard rocket trying to launch a satellite is revealed; the difficulty is reported to have been defects in the first-stage engine control system.

February 6—The Air Force announces the successful firing of its long-range tactical missile, the Mace.

February 7—The Department of Defense sets up an agency to study weapons and rockets and outer space vehicles.

An intercontinental ballistic missile, the Air Force Atlas, is successfully launched

but destroys itself at the end of the powered phase of its flight.

February 8—A special committee of 13 Senators is formed to frame legislation to coordinate space exploration and development.

February 10—The Navy reveals the development of a radically different torpedo, fired by a rocket.

February 12—One Explorer radio is silent after 11 days of transmitting information.

February 20—An Atlas missile explodes after an apparently successful take-off.

February 24—The silent Explorer transmitter resumes signalling.

Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy says the proposals for a single chief of staff are not getting "predominant attention."

February 28—An Air Force Thor is fired with a re-entry nose cone, for the first time.

Politics

February 1—The Democratic Advisory Council says that the U.S. is facing "unlimited dangers which it is unprepared to meet."

February 2—The Democratic Advisory Council says that the Eisenhower Administration's economic policies may lead to depression.

February 3—Leaders in the Republican-controlled State Senate say that Grover C. Richman Jr. will not be confirmed as State Attorney General of New Jersey.

February 12—Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Democrat from Virginia, says that he will retire from public life at the expiration of his term in January, 1959.

February 15—President Eisenhower accepts Harold Stassen's resignation. Stassen is leaving his post as special assistant on disarmament problems to run for the Republican nomination for the Pennsylvania governorship.

February 21—The Democratic National Committee attacks Eisenhower for his "Hoover-like approach" to depression.

February 22—Former President Harry S. Truman says that the Eisenhower Administration has led the country to the brink of depression because of five years of "economic misrule."

February 23—Senator William F. Knowland says that he will support Vice-President Richard Nixon for the Presidency in 1960 if he does not seek the Republican nomination for himself.

February 25—Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia says he will run again for the Senate; Mrs. Byrd has consented.

Supreme Court

February 3—The Supreme Court rules unanimously that a union that has not complied with the Taft-Hartley Act may participate in representation elections called by the National Labor Relations Board in some circumstances.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court holds that a seaman injured when a shipowner violates a statute or regulation may recover damages without proof of employer negligence.

The Supreme Court agrees to review the November, 1957, decision of the Court of Appeals in the Memphis gas rate case, at the Government's request.

VENEZUELA

February 1—The Communist party of Venezuela joins the "political truce" established by the political parties.

February 24—The junta reorganizes the Cabinet.

YEMEN

February 8—Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yemeni Prince Saif al-Islam Mohammed al-Badr discuss Yemen's possible entry into the United Arab Republic. Reports declare that Yemen is interested in Egyptian military aid.

February 15—It is reported that Yemeni and irregular troops attacked a British fort in Aden.

YUGOSLAVIA

February 21—Poland and Yugoslavia sign an economic agreement. A permanent economic cooperation committee is established.



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